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Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of estimating treatment allocation rules under
network interference. I propose a method with several attractive features for applica-
tions: (i) it does not rely on the correct specification of a particular structural model;
(ii) it exploits heterogeneity in treatment effects for targeting individuals; (iii) it ac-
commodates arbitrary constraints on the policy function and capacity constraints on
the number of treated units, and (iv) it can also be implemented when network infor-
mation is not accessible to policy-makers. I establish a strong set of guarantees on the
utilitarian regret, i.e., the difference between the average social welfare attained by the
estimated policy function and the maximum attainable welfare. I provide a mixed-
integer linear program formulation, which can be solved using off-the-shelf algorithms.
I discuss the empirical performance in simulations and illustrate the advantages of the
method for targeting information on social networks.
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1 Introduction
One of the main objectives of researchers, a government or an NGO, conducting an experi-
ment or quasi-experiment, is to identify the most effective policy. In the presence of binary
interventions, this task reduces to the question: “which individuals should be targeted, to
maximize social welfare?”. The presence of spillover effects across units and constraints
on the decision space of the policymaker represent key challenges in such a problem. The
goal of this paper is to estimate optimal treatment allocation rules from experiments or
quasi-experiments, in the presence of network interference.
We now discuss the setting under consideration. Units are connected under a possibly
unobserved and fully connected network. Researchers sample n units, collecting informa-
tion on their covariates, outcomes, and covariates of their neighbors, while we do not require
knowledge of the entire population network. Using in-sample information, they aim to es-
timate a treatment allocation rule for new applications. For example, in the experiment
discussed in Cai et al. (2015) on studying the effect of information sessions on insurance
take-up in rural villages, they aim to estimate which individuals the insurance company
should invite to information sessions in other villages. We interpret the policy targeting as
a treatment choice problem (Manski, 2004; Kitagawa and Tetenov, 2018), with treatment
effects propagating to first and possibly second-degree neighbors.1 We consider a two-step
estimation procedure for estimating optimal treatments: in the first step, we estimate the
empirical welfare of the network, as a functional of the policy function; in the second step,
we solve a constrained optimization procedure over the policy space. We name our method
as Network Empirical Welfare Maximization (NEWM).
Common approaches for optimal treatment allocation rules assume no spillovers across
units. However, ignoring network effects can lead to sub-optimal allocations. We illustrate
this point using data that originated from Cai et al. (2015). We showcase that using
network information for estimating targeting rules leads to improvements between five and
approximately forty percentage points on the probability of insurance adoption on new
villages relative to methods that ignore network effects. Such difference is driven by two
key facts: (i) ignoring spillovers may induce treatments on non-central individuals; (ii)
treatment effect estimators may be biased if network effects are not considered.
Motivated by these considerations, this paper discusses the problem of network tar-
geting, addressing three key challenges that researchers face in practice: (i) the treatment
generates direct and spillover effects, possibly heterogenously in observable or unobserv-
able characteristics, such as age, education or network characteristics; the dependence of
potential outcomes with covariates may be possibly unknown and unspecified;2 (ii) the
1This condition is known as local interference (Manski, 2013), and it is a common assumption in practice.
Examples include Sinclair et al. (2012); Bhattacharya et al. (2013); Duflo et al. (2011) among others.
2Heterogeneity is widely documented in applications. In development studies, for example, Dupas and
Robinson (2013) has documented stronger effects of saving technologies on married women. Similarly,
Banerjee et al. (2017) shows significantly larger effects of microfinance credits to existing entrepreneurs.
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policymaker may not necessarily have access to the network in the target sample, due, for
instance, to the high cost associated with collecting network information;3 (iii) ethical or
legal constraints may further restrict the action space of the decision-maker. This frame-
work encompasses a large number of economic examples from the literature: spillovers
in public policy programs (Muralidharan et al., 2017), cash transfer programs (Barrera-
Osorio et al., 2011), educational programs (Opper, 2016), health programs (Dupas, 2014),
viral marketing (Leskovec et al., 2007; Zubcsek and Sarvary, 2011), advertising campaigns
(Jones et al., 2017).4
From a theoretical perspective, the contribution of this paper is three-fold: (i) we pro-
vide a set of weak conditions to identify the social welfare under local interference and
random network formation; (ii) we discuss the first set of guarantees for individualized
treatment assignment rules on the utilitarian regret under interference, i.e., on the differ-
ence between the best utility achieved at the truly optimal policy function and the expected
utility from deploying the estimated policy function; (iii) we show that for a large class of
policy functions, the optimization problem can be written as a mixed-integer linear pro-
gram, which can be solved using off-the-shelf optimization routines. We now discuss each
of these contributions in detail.
In Section 3, we provide identification results of the social welfare under interference.
The population network may be unknown to policymakers, and the utilitarian welfare also
depends on the distribution of the edges across individuals. We do not impose restrictions
on the network formation model, but instead, we consider the case where target and sample
units may have different network characteristics, and we formally quantify its effect on
the properties of the policy function. A distinctive feature of network interference is that
spillovers may also incur over the compliance of individuals. For instance, in the problem of
Cai et al. (2015), we may expect that inviting individuals to information sessions may affect
the attendance of others. We showcase that, in the presence of one-degree interference, and
exogenous spillovers over the compliance rate, the welfare can be equivalently represented
using a second-degree interference model. Such a result allows simple extensions of the
proposed approach also to such a setting.
Equipped with these results, we design a policy function with guarantees on the re-
gret. Policies whose regret is guaranteed to be bounded uniformly in the sample size are
particularly appealing from both a theoretical and applied perspective: policymakers are
often interested in guarantees on the estimated policy when scaled at the population level.
In our theoretical analysis, we show that under weak restrictions on the function class of
interest, local dependence, and under standard moment conditions, the regret scales at the
optimal rate 1/
√
n, under bounded degree. In the presence of an unbounded degree, we
3For a discussion on the costs associated to the collection of network information, the reader may refer
to Breza et al. (2017).
4Spillover effects have been documented in development economics (Banerjee et al., 2013), education
economics (Carrell et al., 2013), social economics (Kling et al., 2007; Sobel, 2006), political science (Bond
et al., 2012), medicine (Valente et al., 2007; Christakis and Fowler, 2010) among many others.
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characterize the rate as a function of the maximum degree, which captures the level of
dependence across variables. We discuss properties under known, and unknown propensity
score, and when double robust estimators are employed for the estimation of causal effects.
In the latter case, we propose a novel sample splitting procedure that exploits chromatic
properties of the network for achieving 1/
√
n convergence rate of the regret, in the presence
of a fully connected network.
We derive results under weak moment conditions and dependent observations, where
the effects of the policy are mediated via the network structure. The generality of such
a framework requires new theoretical arguments compared to the previous literature on
statistical treatment choice. We deal with local dependence by partitioning individuals
into groups of independent but not necessarily identically distributed observations, and
we provide bounds on the maximal size of such partition as a function of the chromatic
number, and, ultimately, the maximum degree. We exploit properties of the chromatic
number obtained from a new network where sampled units are connected within the same
neighborhood with a radius proportional to the degree of dependence across observations.
To bound the complexity of the function class obtained from the composition of direct
and spillover effects, we exploit contraction inequalities (Ledoux and Talagrand, 2011),
appropriately derived for the context under consideration.
The presence of network interference leads to a novel formulation of the optimal policy
targeting problem. We derive an exact mixed-integer linear program of such a problem,
allowing for a large class of policy function classes, which also includes maximum score esti-
mators (Florios and Skouras, 2008). Compared to standard i.i.d. settings, the formulation
introduces an additional set of linear constraints for representing spillover effects linearly
in the objective function, and it permits efficient computations using off-the-shelf linear
mixed-integer program solvers. In a simulation exercise, we showcase the advantage of the
proposed methodology over methods that ignore network effects. Finally, in our empiri-
cal application, the NEWM method showcases significant out-of-sample improvements in
welfare when compared to random seeding strategies (Akbarpour et al., 2018), to methods
that ignore network effect, and to the allocation that treats individuals with the largest
degree.
We organize the paper as follows. In the remaining part of this section, we discuss the
related literature. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the method. In Section 3, we
discuss the identification condition, the causal estimands, and the welfare function. Estima-
tion is contained in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the theoretical properties; optimization is
contained in Section 6; Section 7 contains discussion for higher order interference; Section
8 contains extensions, Section 9 the empirical application and Section 10 concludes. All
derivations are also contained in the Appendix.
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1.1 Related Literature
In economics, common methods for targeting on network targeting on networks consists
of targeting based on some particular measure of centrality (Bloch et al., 2017). Recent
advances include Jackson and Storms (2018), Akbarpour et al. (2018), Banerjee et al.
(2017), Banerjee et al. (2014), Galeotti and Goyal (2009) among others. Studying the
influence of individuals on a network is a topic of interest also in disciplines, including
computer science and marketing, where examples include Domingos and Richardson (2001),
Kempe et al. (2003), Eckles et al. (2019) and references therein. Key differences from
previous references are: (i) assumptions on homogeneity in the effects (e.g., Akbarpour
et al. (2018)); (ii) lack of constraints on the policy space, and methods that often require
knowledge of the network structure also of the target units (e.g., Galeotti et al. (2017));
(iii) structural modeling assumptions to justify a particular procedure or a specific measure
of centrality (Eckles et al., 2019; Banerjee et al., 2014).
From an empirical perspective, the above methods have one additional disadvantage: an
empirical comparison across one or more measures of centrality requires expensive cluster
design experiments that consists of randomizing two or more policy rules on independent
clusters (Banerjee et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2015). This paper instead (i) does not rely on
one specific centrality measure (e.g., only degree or eigenvector centrality), but instead,
it permits to combine different centrality measures to target individuals optimally; (ii) its
estimation does not impose severe restrictions on the design of the experiment, and it can
also be implemented in the presence of observational studies.
We build a connection to the econometric and statistical literature on inference on net-
works, including literature on social interaction (Manski, 2013; Manresa, 2013), peer effects
(Bramoulle´ et al., 2009), networks (De Paula, 2017) and more generally causal inference
under interference (Liu et al., 2019; Baird et al., 2018; Leung, 2019; Li et al., 2019; Hudgens
and Halloran, 2008; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013; Chin et al., 2018; Sobel, 2006;
van der Laan, 2012; Ogburn et al., 2017; Athey et al., 2018; Ogburn et al., 2017; Imai et al.,
2018; Kang and Imbens, 2016; Vazquez-Bare, 2020). Non-parametric estimation of causal
effects builds on inverse-probability weighting (IPW) (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952) and
augmented IPW (AIPW) estimators (Robins et al., 1994) under network interference, pre-
viously discussed also in Aronow et al. (2017) and Aronow and Samii (2013) among others.
The authors consider a fixed and possibly fully observable network structure, whereas here
we consider a random and not fully observable network structure, which, together with the
dependence of the estimand on the policy function, requires a different set of identification
conditions. More generally, the literature on inference on networks has focused on design-
ing estimators of causal effects, without giving attention to the statistical treatment choice
problem discussed in the current paper. Knowledge of treatment effects is not sufficient
to construct optimal treatment rules in the presence of either (or both) constraints on the
policy functions or spillover effects with an opposite sign than direct effects.
Spillover effects have been studied in the context of policy intervention from differ-
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ent angles. Bhattacharya et al. (2019) and Wager and Xu (2019) study the effect of a
global policy intervention on social welfare. In the first case, the authors propose a partial
identification framework for inference on the effects of the policy, whereas in the second
case, they propose a structural model for studying pricing on online platforms. Here in-
stead, we consider individualized policy interventions, allowing for local interference and
non-parametric identification. The presence of a random network formation model and
constraints on the policy function motivates the identification and theoretical guarantees
discussed in the current paper. In the presence of spillover effects, Li et al. (2019), Graham
et al. (2010), Bhattacharya (2009) consider the problem of optimal allocation of individuals
across independepent groups. Differences are: (i) policy functions denote group assignment
mechanisms, instead of binary treatment allocations, inducing a different definition and
identification of the welfare function; (ii) the allocation does not allow for constrained en-
vironments, and (iii) the authors assume a clustered network structures, where interference
between clusters does not occur.
This paper builds on the growing literature on statistical treatment rules, also known
as empirical welfare maximization (EWM), by proposing novel methods for optimal policy
targeting under interference. Regret analysis is often a central topic in this literature,
and examples include Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) Kitagawa and Tetenov (2017), Athey
and Wager (2017), Mbakop and Tabord-Meehan (2016). A list of additional references on
optimal treatment allocation includes Armstrong and Shen (2015), Bhattacharya and Du-
pas (2012), Dehejia (2005), Hirano and Porter (2009), Stoye (2009), Stoye (2012),Tetenov
(2012) among others. Further research on optimal treatment allocations also includes es-
timation of individualized optimal treatments via residuals weighting (Zhou et al., 2017),
estimation of optimal treatment via penalized methods (Qian and Murphy, 2011), infer-
ence on the welfare for optimal treatment strategies (Luedtke and Van Der Laan, 2016;
Labe et al., 2014), double robust methods for treatment allocations (Zhang et al., 2012),
reinforcement learning (Kallus, 2017; Lu et al., 2018), and dynamic treatment regimes
(Murphy, 2003; Nie et al., 2019). Further connections are more broadly related to the
literature on classification, which includes Boucheron et al. (2005), and Elliott and Lieli
(2013) among others. Our focus is quite different from previous references: we estimate an
optimal policy when the violation of SUTVA occurs.
Optimal treatment allocations have been considered in parallel literature on statistics
and machine learning. Su et al. (2019) discusses the problem of optimal treatment under
interference in an unconstrained environment. Their method assumes a linear model where
interactions between the individual treatment and the number of treated neighbors are not
allowed. In this paper, instead, we do not impose such structural assumptions. The
presence of constraints leads to a different optimization and estimation problem, and it
motivates the regret analysis discussed in the current paper. Laber et al. (2018) instead
consider a Bayesian structural model whose estimation relies on computational intensive
Monte Carlo methods, and the method relies on the correct model specification.
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2 Overview of the Method
In this section, we introduce a stylized description of the problem to illustrate how the
proposed methodology works in the simplest possible scenario. We defer a comprehensive
discussion on the identification conditions and estimation in later sections. In this example,
we consider the problem discussed in Cai et al. (2015) of targeting information for insurance
adoption to individuals.5 During the experiment, researchers collected network information
in rural villages.
We let the outcome of interest Yi denote insurance adoption. We aim to estimate a
targeting rule that based on observable characteristics of individuals, decides whether to
target information to individuals in other villages. For each unit i we denote Di ∈ {0, 1}
the treatment assignment in the experiment. We denote Ni the neighbors of unit i. We
denote Zi ∈ Z the vector of covariates. Consider a model of the form
Yi = r
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|, εi
)
(1)
for some function r which may be unknown to the researchers. In this definition, Di denotes
the treatment assigned to individual i,
∑
k∈Ni Dk denotes the number of treated neighbors,
and εi denotes unobservables characteristics. The model states that the treatment effects
are local, i.e., only propagate to one degree neighbors, and anonymous, i.e., they do not
depend on neighbors identity. Extensions to higher order interference is discussed in Ap-
pendix 7.
In this paper, we consider a treatment which is randomized according to the following
model
Di = f(Zi, εDi), εDi ∼iid D. (2)
Since Zi is allowed to contain arbitrary network information, the assignment mechanism
can also depend on observable characteristics of the network.
The planner’s goal is to design a treatment mechanism that maximizes social welfare
with the following characteristics:
(A) Individuals may be treated differently, depending on observables characteristics;
(B) The assignment mechanism must be easy to implement, without requiring knowledge
of the population network or of covariates of all other individuals;
(C) The assignment mechanism can be subject to arbitrary constraints (e.g., ethical or
economic constraints).
5Throughout the rest of the paper, we will refer to this example as the leading explanatory example. On
the other hand, our discussion also applies to more general cases, which might include marketing campaigns,
economic programs, and others.
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For instance, the insurance company may not have access to network information to new
villages, where experiments have not been conducted. In addition, the insurance company
may prefer to impose gender parity on the number of individuals invited to the information
session. The proposed assignment mechanism maps from an arbitrary subset of covariates
Xi ⊂ (Zi, |Ni|), Xi ∈ X to either treatment or control, and it is defined as follows:
pi : X 7→ {0, 1}, pi ∈ Π. (3)
The set Π encodes all such constraints, and the set Xi denotes the variables that are
available to the policy-maker for the targeting exercise.
Example 2.1. Consider the following linear rule
pi(Z
(1)
i , Z
(2)
i , |Ni|) = 1{β0 + Z(1)i β1 + Z(2)i β2 + |Ni|β3 ≥ 0} (4)
where Z
(1)
i denotes age and Z
(2)
i education. Then the class function is indexed by the pa-
rameters (β0, β1, β2, β3) and allocations consist in assignign individuals based on a weighted
average of their income, education and number of neighbors.
By letting I denote the set of individuals who live in villages that the company is
planning to target next, and |I| its cardinality, the welfare criterion is obtained by averaging
the effects generated by such policy function over target units:
W (pi) =
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
E
[
r
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, εi
)]
. (5)
The expectation is taken also with respect to network information, namely with respect to
the vector (Xi, Xk∈Ni , Ni, Zi, εi). Given the estimate Wˆn(pi) for the social welfare, discussed
in Section 4, the second step consists in estimating the policy function by maximizing the
estimated welfare, formally:
pˆi ∈ arg max
pi∈Π
Wˆn(pi). (6)
We show that the above optimization problem can be cast as a mixed-integer linear
program, for which off-the-shelf fast optimization algorithms are available. A question that
arises is “how would such a policy perform once implemented on other villages?”. Formally,
the question aims to study the behavior of the following difference
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆi). (7)
The above expression denotes the difference in the population welfare, between the truly
optimal policy and the estimated policy. We showcase that under weak distributional
conditions, the welfare W (pˆi) evaluated at the policy that maximizes the in-sample wel-
fare converges in expectation to the oracle welfare at the optimal rate (i.e., 1/
√
n). The
bound also depends on the structure of the network as well as the degree of dependence of
observations, and further discussion is deferred to Section 5.
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Remark 1. (Higher Order Interference and Intention to Treat) Whenever interference
over compliance occurs, the model reads similarly from an intention to treat perspective,
under the condition that interference is of second-order degree. Formally, in the presence
of non-compliance, let Di ∈ {0, 1} denote the assigned treatment and Ti ∈ {0, 1} denotes
the factual treatment that individuals choose. We consider spillovers over the outcome and
over the compliance rate. One such model that we consider is the following.
Yi = r˜
c
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Ti,
∑
k∈Ni
Tk, |Ni|, ε˜i
)
, Ti = h
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, |Ni|, νi
)
where νi, ε˜i denote unobservables. In this model, the outcome can potentially depend on the
individual and neighbors’ treatment assignments as well as the individual and neighbors’
treatmet choice. Intuitively, in the case of Cai et al. (2015), we may assume that whether
an individual is invited to an information session, may affect the participation of other
individuals, by, for instance, spreading the rumor about such a session in the village. Under
this formulation we can equivalently rewrite the outcome variable as follows:
Yi = r2
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk,
∑
k∈Ni,2
Dk, |Ni|, |Ni,2|, εi
)
,
for some unobservable εi and some possibly unknown function r2(.), where Ni,2 denote the
second-degree neighbors (i.e., neighbors of neighbors). In such a case, the model reads from
an intention to treat perspective under second-degree interference. Therefore, the welfare
reads as follows:
W2(pi) =
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
E
[
r2
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk),
∑
k∈Ni,2
pi(Xk), |Ni|, |Ni,2|, εi
)]
. (8)
For expositional convenience, throughout our discussion, we consider first degree inter-
ference models and we defer extensions to the above higher order interference model to
Appendix 7.6
Remark 2. (When is a Global Policy not Optimal?) One important question is whether
treating all or none of the individuals may be the optimal policy. For example, we may
consider that inviting all individuals to information sessions is the optimal policy. In three
circumstances, global policies are not necessarily optimal:
(i) Effects are homogenous in covariates, whereas direct and spillover effects have oppo-
site signs;
6Discussion on treatment effects and spillover effects under non-compliance in the different settings of
inference and not policy targeting can be found in Imai et al. (2018), Kang and Imbens (2016), Vazquez-
Bare (2020). One key difference from previous references relies on the following observation that we make
in this paper: by considering exogenous and not endogenous spillovers in the actual treatment status Ti,
identification can be obtained by augmenting the interference model to a second degree.
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(ii) Direct and possibly spillover effects are heterogenous in covariates;
(iii) Capacity constraints on the number of treated units are imposed.
Such circumstances often arise in economic applications. For instance, due to cost consid-
erations, only a portion of the population can be invited to information sessions.
3 Set up and Identification
This section discusses the main identification conditions, the causal estimands of interest,
and it defines the utilitarian welfare under interference.
3.1 Data and Set Up
We consider a random, possibly fully connected network, and we discuss the problem from
a superpopulation perspective. Since the entire network information may be unknown to
researchers, edges between individuals are let to be random. We consider the following
sampling scheme: N units are connected with adjacency matrix A ∈ A, drawn from a
super-population. The researcher samples n ≤ N units participating in the experiment.
We let Yi ∈ Y be the outcome, and Di ∈ {0, 1} be the treatment assignment indicator.
We denote the set of neighbors of each individual to be Ni = {j 6= i : Ai,j = 1} where
Ai,j ∈ {0, 1} denotes the edge between individual i and j. We consider Ai,j ∈ {0, 1} and
Ai,i = 0. For notational convenience only, we consider a symmetric adjacency matrix.
Extensions to weighted and directed networks follow similarly to what discussed in the
current section (the reader may refer to Remark 5).
We let |Ni| denote the cardinality of the set Ni. For each individual i, we observe
covariates of interest Zi ∈ Z. Such vector may contain individual, network information, and
possibly also neighbors’ covariates sufficient statistics. We consider treatment allocations
that depend on an arbitrary subset of individual characteristics Xi ⊆ (Zi, |Ni|), Xi ∈ X ,
having the same number of entries for each unit. Such covariates Xi can include network
information such as degree centrality of individual i, as well as individual covariates such
as age or education. Whenever we omit the index from the random variable of interest, we
refer to the vector of random variables for all units i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
We assume that the researcher has information on first-degree neighbors of each sampled
individual. Namely, we assume that researchers sample n units and, for each unit, they
observe the vector (
Yi, Zi, Zj∈Ni , Di, Dj∈Ni , Ni
)
.
We consider the problem where the researchers run an experiment after sampling units
i ∈ {1, ..., n} from a population PS . We then target units i ∈ I possibly drawn from a
different population PT . Identification conditions are only imposed on sampled units. On
the other hand, sampled and targeted units are assumed to follow the same interference
model outlined below.
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3.2 Interference
In the presence of interference, the outcome of individual i depends on its treatment as-
signment as well as the treatment assignments of all other units. We define outcomes to
be functions of the treatment assignment of each unit D = {Dj}, Dj ∈ {0, 1} and of the
population networks’ adjacency matrix A as well as covariates and unobserved factors. In
full generality we define
Yi = r˜(i,D,A,Zi, εi), (9)
where εi defines unobservables. We impose that the outcomes only depend on the treatment
assigned to their first-degree neighbors, and we make assumptions on interactions being
anonymous (Manski, 2013).
Assumption 3.1. (Interference) For all (i, j), given D = {Dk}, D˜ = {D˜k} and A, A˜ ∈ A,
r˜(i,D,A, z, e) = r˜(j, D˜, A˜, z, e)
for all z ∈ Z, e ∈ {supp(εi) ∪ supp(εj)}, if all the following three conditions hold: (i)∑
k Ai,k =
∑
k A˜j,k; (ii)
∑
k Ai,kDk =
∑
k A˜i,kD˜k; (iii) Di = D˜j .
Assumption 3.1 postulates that outcomes only depend on (i) the number of first-degree
neighbors, (ii) the number of first-degree treated neighbors (iii) individual’s treatment
status as well as covariates of interest. Under this assumption, we define outcomes as
Yi = r
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|, εi
)
. (10)
Assumption 3.1 is equivalent to assuming anonymous interactions and one-degree in-
terference and similar conditions can be found in Leung (2019). Assumption 3.1 accommo-
dates for any type of anonymous interactions. For instance, potential outcomes can depend
on the number of treated neighbors or the average number of treated neighbors, or even
on the product of neighbors’ treatment allocation (i.e., on whether at least one neighbor is
treated). One degree interference is common in the literature on the network interference,
see, for example, He and Song (2018). Anonymous interactions are also common, see for
example Vazquez-Bare (2017). Athey et al. (2018) provide a general framework for testing
such assumptions. Throughout our discussion, we will let Assumption 3.1 holds.
Example 3.1. (Spatial Spillovers in India) Muralidharan et al. (2017) study general equi-
librium effect of a public policy in India implemented at government post offices level. The
authors consider a model for spatial spillovers of the form
Yi,m,p,d = α+ βN˜
R
p + λDp + δZm,d + εi,m,d
where i index household level, m denotes the mandal, p the panchayat and d the district.
The authors consider N˜Rp denoting either the percentage of treated government offices within
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a radius R, from the panchayat p, or the percentage of treated neighbors, in a different
mandal m. In the first case, the model satisfies the Assumption 3.1, for the adjacency
matrix being such that Ai,j = 1 if (i, j) are within radius R. In the second case, the
model satisfies Assumption 3.1, for the adjacency matrix A being such that Ai,j = 1 if two
individuals are distant within a radius R and they belong to different mandals.
Example 3.2. (Within Household Spillovers) Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011) study the ef-
fect of education-based conditional cash transfer on school attendance. As also discussed
in Vazquez-Bare (2017), spillovers may occurring within the households, and the author
considers a model of the form
Yi = τ1Di +
∑
j∈Ni
(1−Dj)τ2 +
∑
k∈Ni
Dkτ3 + εi,
where Ni denotes the element in the same household of individual i. Then Assumption 3.1
is satisfied.
3.3 Identification and Dependence
In our discussion, we consider the case where unobservable characteristics εi are identically
distributed given the same covariates and number of neighbors, but we do not impose
further distributional assumptions on edges or covariates.
Assumption 3.2. For all (i, j),
P (εi ≤ x|Zi = z, |Ni| = l) = P (εj ≤ x|Zj = z, |Nj | = l)
for all z ∈ Z, l ∈ Z, x ∈ supp(εi) ∪ supp(εj)
The condition permits to estimate the conditional mean function from the experiment
consistently.
Network data often present dependence across units. Here we assume that individuals
that are neighbors and that do not share any common neighbor are pairwise independent.
Assumption 3.3. (M-Local Dependence) Assume that for any A ∈ A and some possibly
unknown M ≥ 2, (
εi, Zi, Zk∈Ni
)
⊥
(
εj , Zj , Zk∈Nj
)∣∣∣A
for any {(j, i) ∈ {1, ..., n}2 : j 6= i, j 6∈ Ni,M−1}, where Ni,M−1 denote the set of nodes
connected to i by at most M − 1 edges.7
7Formally, such set is defined as the set {k : AM−1i,k 6= 0}.
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V1 V2 V3 V4V5
Figure 1: Example of network. Under Assumption 3.3 with M = 4, the vectors(
εi, Zi, Zk∈Ni
)
are independent only between V5 and V4, while they can be dependent
for any other pair of nodes.
Assumption 3.3 states that the vectors of covariates, potential outcomes, first degree,
and second-degree neighbors treatment assignments and neighbors’ covariates are indepen-
dent for individuals that are not in a neighborhood up to M − 1 neighbors. For example,
whenever M = 4, the assumption accommodates for three-degree local dependence of po-
tential outcomes, and it holds for one-degree local dependence of neighbors’ covariates and
treatment assignments.
Whereas M has an effect on the theoretical results, M does not need to be known to
researchers for welfare estimation.
Example 3.3. (Graphical Illustration) Consider Figure 1: under Assumption 3.3, for
M = 4, for each node the corresponding vector
(
εi, Zi, Zk∈Ni
)
are independent only between
V5 and V4, while they can be dependent for any other pair of nodes.
We state the assumption conditional on the population adjacency matrix A. The choice
of conditioning on A guarantees independence of the vector Zi, Zj also when these vectors
contain measures of network centrality respectively of nodes i and j.
Example 3.4. Let
Yi = r
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|,
∑
k∈Ni
ηk
)
.
Let {ηk} be i.i.d.. Then εi =
∑
k∈Ni ηk and εi ⊥ εj |A for i 6∈ Nj,2, where Nj,2 = Nj ∪{Nk, k ∈ Nj}.
In a causal inference framework, ignorability conditions are often necessary for valid
inference (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). In the presence of random network formation and
under violation of SUTVA, we need to reformulate ignorability by appropriately accounting
for these effects.
Assumption 3.4. (Unconfoundeness) For some arbitrary function fD(.), let the following
hold:
(A) Di = fD(Zi, εDi) and εDi are i.i.d., and εDi ⊥ {Zj , Nj , εj , Zk∈Nj , Nk∈Nj , εk∈Nj}j∈{1,...,n};
(B) For each i, εi ⊥
(
Ni, Zk∈Ni , Nk∈Ni
)∣∣∣Zi, |Ni|.
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Condition (A) states that the treatment is randomized in the experiment based on
observable Zi. Since Zi may contain network information of a given individual, the as-
sumption also accommodates for randomization schemes where treatment assignment is
based on network information. Condition (A) is commonly assumed also in setting with
no interference (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Condition (B) imposes conditional network ex-
ogeneity, given individual covariates, neighbors’ statistics contained in Zi and the number
of neighbors. The assumption states the following conditions: (i) Zi contains sufficient
information on neighbors’ covariates; (ii) neighbors’ identity is independent on potential
outcomes given individual characteristics and neighbors’ sufficient statistics and given the
number of neighbors. Spillover effects induced by a given policy function may also depend
on neighbors’ covariates Xk∈Ni . Therefore, the conditional independence of potential out-
comes on such covariates is necessary to guarantee the unconfounded estimation of such
effects. Network exogeneity is necessary to guarantee that spillover effects are not con-
founded by the treatment assignment mechanism. Condition (A) can be found in Forastiere
et al. (2016), Aronow et al. (2017) and variants of network exogeneity in (B) can be found
in Leung (2019), He and Song (2018) among others.
3.3.1 Causal Estimands
Next, we discuss the causal estimands of interest.
Definition 3.1. (Conditional Mean) Under Assumption 3.2 the conditional mean function
is defined as
m(d, s, z, l) = E
[
r(d, s, Zi, |Ni|, εi)
∣∣∣Zi = z, |Ni| = l] (11)
as a function of (d, s, z, l) only.
Assumption 3.2 is necessary in order for the conditional mean function to be identical
across units.
The second causal estimand of interest is the propensity score. We denote the propen-
sity score as the joint probability of treating a given individual and assigning a given
number of neighbors to treatment.
Definition 3.2. (Propensity Score) Under Condition (i) in Assumption 3.4, the propensity
score is defined as
e(d, s,x, z, l) = P
(
Di = d,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk = s
∣∣∣Zk∈Ni = x, Zi = z, |Ni| = l)
for d ∈ {0, 1}, s ∈ Z, s ≤ l, as a function of (d, s,x, z, l) only.
The definition of the propensity score follows from the literature on multi-valued treat-
ments (Imbens, 2000), while it is adapted to the context of policy assignment that we con-
sider in the current paper. Condition (i) in Assumption 3.4 guarantees that the propensity
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score does not depend on the index of unit i or of its neighbors. Instead, it allows the
propensity score to depend on the number of neighbors and on individual and neighbors’
covariates. Condition (B) in Assumption 3.4, also permits to decompose e(d, s,x, z, l) as a
sum of products of conditional marginal probabilities. The lemma above directly follows
from the conditional independence assumption.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption 3.4, the following identity holds:
e(d, s,x, z, l) = P
(
Di = d|Zi = z
)
×
∑
u1,...,ul:
∑
v uv=s
l∏
k=1
P
(
D
N
(k)
i
= uk
∣∣∣Z
N
(k)
i
= xk,.
)
.
(12)
Remark 3. Whenever fD(Zi, e) only depends on {Xi \ |Ni|}, researchers are required to
observe only such information for the neighbors of individual i.
3.4 Welfare of Networks
We consider the problem of designing an individual-specific and deterministic policy func-
tion pi : X 7→ {0, 1} that maps to individual treatment assignment8. The map amounts to
a partition of X , the support of Xi.
We assume that pi ∈ Π, where Π denotes some given function class. We aim to maximize
the welfare on the target population I. Following Manski (2004), we define welfare from a
utilitarian perspective, as the expected outcome obtained on such population. The welfare
on the target units is defined as
1
|I|
∑
j∈I
E
[
r
(
pi(Xj),
∑
k∈Nj
pi(Xk), Zj , |Nj |, εj
)]
,
namely to the average effect over each unit in the target population, where the expectation
is taken with respect to covariates, neighbors’ covariates, unobservables, and edges.
The welfare in the above equation differs from the definition of welfare in Kitagawa
and Tetenov (2018), Manski (2004) and Murphy (2003), since the potential outcome also
depends on the treatment assignment of other individuals. The welfare also differs from
Su et al. (2019), where the authors impose a parametric linear model without interactions
between individual and neighbors’ treatment status.
8The policy function is individual-specific in the sense that for individual i, it maps from a given set of
covariates, that can potentially also include a measure of centrality of such individual and other covariates,
to the treatment of individual i only. Such policy function may be preferred to policy functions that assign
partitions of individuals to treatment for the following reasons: (i) it can be implemented in online fashion,
individual by individual, which is often of interest in many applications such as viral marketing; (ii) it is
feasible, since it does not require knowledge of the population network and covariates of all units.
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In practice, we will replace W (pi) with its sample analog Wn(pi). The expected value
of the in-sample welfare is defined as follows.
E[Wn(pi)] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
r
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, εi
)]
. (13)
In the following result, we identify the expected value of the welfare in terms of the condi-
tional mean function of the potential outcome.
Lemma 3.2. Let Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 hold. Then for any function pi
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
r(pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, εi)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
m
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|
)]
The above result permits to estimate the in-sample welfare by for instance first estimating
the conditional mean function and then taking the sample average over such functions,
evaluated at the realized values of the random variables.9
On the other hand, the distribution of the network may differ across sampled and
target units. Discrepancies between the expected welfare of sample units and the targeted
welfare W (pi) will reflect in the quality of the estimated policy function. To quantify such
discrepancy, we aim to quantify the distance between the welfare W (pi) and the expected
in-sample welfare, which is defined as above. We introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.3. (Sample-Target Discrepancy) Let
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
m
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|
)]
−W (pi)
∣∣∣ = KΠ(n),
for some function KΠ(.) : Z 7→ R+.
KΠ(.) denotes the difference between the expected welfare of in-sample units and the
welfare of the target population. Such difference captures the bias induced by estimating
the policy function on units that are possibly drawn from a different population than target
units. In the following lemma we provide conditions for the discrepancy to be equal to zero.
9To motivate the conditions stated, we provide the main argument in the following lines. By the law of
iterated expectations, we write
E
[
r(pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, εi)
]
= E
[
E
[
r(pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, εi)
∣∣∣Zi, Ni, Xk∈Ni ]]
Under Assumption 3.2, 3.4, we obtain
E
[
E
[
r(pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, εi)
∣∣∣Zi, Ni, Xk∈Ni]] = E[m(pi(Xi), ∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|)
]
.
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Lemma 3.3. Suppose that (Zi, Ai,. ⊗ X,Ai,., εi) ∼ P for all i in the target and sample
population. Then KΠ(n) = 0.
In the lemma above we showcase that KΠ(n) is equal to zero whenever the vector
(εi, Zi, {Xk : Ai,k = 1}, Ai,.) for target and sample units is drawn from the same distribu-
tion. The lemma follows from the definition of welfare under interference. Such condition
requires that researchers sample the vector (εi, Zi, {Xk : Ai,k = 1}, Ai,.) of units partici-
pating in the experiment from a super-population of interest at random.10
Lemma 3.3 is satisfied in models of interest in economics, such as in the partial linear
regression model discussed in Auerbach (2019) and geometric network formation models
(Chandrasekhar, 2016). We provide an illustrative example below.
Example 3.5. Suppose each i in the sample and target population satisfies the following
conditions:
(A) Ai,j = fA(ηi, ηj , αi,j) where {αi,.} are identically distributed for all i, and ηi being
i.i.d.;
(B) (Zi, εi) = fZ,ε(
∑
k Ai,kg(ηk),
∑
k Ai,k, ηi);
for arbitrary functions fZ,ε, g, fA. Then KΠ(n) = 0.
The example above accommodates for inter-dependence across edges, through the de-
pendence of αi,. as well as the dependence of edges with covariates through the unobservable
ηi. On the other hand, we remark that in this paper, we do not impose one specific net-
work model, and many other examples can be constructed, such that KΠ(n) = 0. In full
generality, we will characterize the error of the policy function also as a function of the
target-sample discrepancy.
Remark 4. The reader may observe that in the definition above, 1/n may be substituted by
data-dependent weights wi. Using weights wi may reflect prior knowledge of the researcher
on differences between the distribution of sample and target units. Further discussion in
such a setting is provided in Section 8.2.
Remark 5. (Weighted Graphs) The definition of welfare and the causal estimands of
interest easily generalize to weighted adjacency matrices. In such a case, spillover effects
are defined as
∑
k Ai,kpi(Xk), and researchers are assumed to observe covariates of the
neighbors of units i ∈ {1, ..., n} for which weights in the adjacency matrix are non-zero.
10 To gain further intuition, notice that the condition in the above example is satisfied if the conditional
distribution of Zi given Xj∈Ni = x,Ni = l is the same after exchanging entries in the vector x (e.g., the
dependence between neighbors’ covariates does not depend on neighbors’ identity), and the unconditional
marginal distribution of edges is the same across units.
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4 Welfare Estimation
In this section, we discuss estimators for the welfare criterion. We defer discussion on the
optimization method to Section 6.
4.1 Conditional Mean and Propensity Score
The first step consists of estimating the conditional mean and, if unknown, the propensity
score. The estimation of either of these two quantities may be misspecified. In our dis-
cussion, we let researchers postulate the counterfactual outcome to be mc(d, s, z, l) being
potentially misspecified and postulate ec(d, s,x, z, l) that is assumed to satisfy the strict
overlap condition (e.g., trimming is imposed under weak overlap). We denote mˆc and eˆc
being the estimated conditional mean and propensity score.
Estimation of mc may be straightforward under Assumption 3.2, since the conditional
mean function is assumed to be the same across units. For estimating the propensity score,
Lemma 3.1 provides a simple and easy-to-use expression, which only requires to estimate
P (Di = 1|Zi) via, for instance, Maximum-Likelihood, and then using the expression for
computing the propensity score.
Remark 6. (Sample Splitting for Rate Improvement) Whenever the network can be par-
titioned into independent components, estimation of the conditional mean function and
propensity score using a sample splitting procedure can improve rates of convergence, simi-
larly to what discussed in the i.i.d. setting in Chernozhukov et al. (2018) among others. On
the other hand, sample splitting may not always be possible to implement in the presence of
a fully connected network. In Section 5, we discuss the case when sample splitting is and
is not implemented, proposing valid sample splitting algorithms in the presence of a fully
connected network.
4.2 Welfare Function
For notational convenience, we let Si(pi) =
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk) be the assigned treatment to
neighbors of i under policy pi. A non parametric estimator of the welfare function is
denoted as
W ipwn (pi, e
c) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Si(pi) =
∑
k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) Yi. (14)
We denote Wˆ ipwn (pi, eˆc) the corresponding estimator with ec being substituted by the esti-
mated propensity score eˆc.
Non-parametric estimators of causal effects under interference have been discussed in
Aronow et al. (2017), Chin et al. (2018) for unconditional probabilities and Forastiere et al.
(2016) for conditional probabilities, in the context of inference on networks, assuming
a fixed network structure. In the context under consideration, the number of treated
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neighbors Si(pi) depends on the array of covariates Xk∈Ni , via the policy function pi. Such
dependence, together with the neighbors’ identity Ni being considered as random, requires
a different identification strategy which imposes conditions also on Zk∈Ni . We formalize
unbiasness of the estimator in the following lines.
Lemma 4.1. Let Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 hold. Then
E
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
e
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) Yi] = E[m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)].
The proof is in the Appendix. One possible disadvantage of the above estimator is
large variance. Therefore, we also consider the following double robust estimator (AIPW)
of the welfare function of the following form:
W aipwn (pi,m
c, ec) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Si(pi) =
∑
k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) (Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
mc
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)
.
(15)
We denote Wˆ aipwn (pi, mˆc, eˆc) the welfare for estimated propensity score and conditional
mean. The estimator inherit double robust properties similarly to what discussed in Robins
et al. (1994), that is, it is easy to show that
E
[
W aipwn (pi,m
c, ec)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
m
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)]
,
if either (or both) ec = e or mc = m.
The estimated policy function maximizes the empirical welfare criterion. Optimization
is deferred to Section 6.
Remark 7. (Increasing overlap by restricting treatment exposures) Additional modeling
restrictions may be imposed to reduce the dimensionality of the problem and guarantee strict
overlap. For example, similarly to Sinclair et al. (2012), the researcher may further assume
that individuals have different neighbors’ treatment exposure whenever the percentage of
treated neighbors exceed some prespecified treshold. Namely, suppose that the researcher
imposes the following restriction, for some ordered τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4:
11
r(d, s, z, l, e)

(A) r¯1(d, z, l, e) if s/l ≤ τ1
(B) r¯2(d, z, l, e) if τ1 < s/l ≤ τ2
(C) r¯3(d, z, l, e) if τ2 < s/l ≤ τ3
(D) r¯4(d, z, l, e) if τ3 < s/l ≤ τ4
(16)
11The choice of four neighbors’ exposures is purely for expositional convenience.
19
for some possibly unknown functions r¯1, r¯2, r¯3, r¯4. Then the number of possible exposures
reduces to 8 different exposures. In such a case the propensity score defines the probability
of each of this exposure. In particular, for the individual treatment assignment d and a
percentage of treated neighbors we have the following definition of propensity score:
e˜(d, τm,x, z, l) = P
(
Di = d, lτm−1 <
∑
k∈Ni
Dk ≤ lτm
∣∣∣Zk∈Ni = x, Zi = z, |Ni| = l)
=
∑
s∈{τm−1,...,τm}
e(d, s,x, z, l).
(17)
Then define
gi(pi) = arg min
m
{|
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk)/|Ni| − τm|, s.t. : τm ≥
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk)/|Ni|}
the index corresponding to the treatment exposure for the given policy intervention. The
inverse-probability estimator takes then the following form
W ipwn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{τgi(pi)−1 <
∑
k∈Ni Dk ≤ τgi(pi), pi(Xi) = Di}
e˜
(
pi(Xi), τgi(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) (18)
and similarly the AIPW estimator. By construction of the estimator, the propensity score
has larger support as the number of treatment exposure decreases.
5 Theoretical Properties
In this section, we discuss the theoretical properties of the estimated policy function. For
a given function class Π, we aim to show that the welfare, evaluated at the optimal policy
converges in expectation to the welfare evaluated at the estimated policy function pˆi. In
our analysis, we impose conditions on the function class Π, on the potential outcomes and
on the function mc(.) and ec(.) defined in Section 4. Such function denote the pseudo-true
conditional mean and propensity score.
Assumption 5.1. Let the following hold:
(LP) mc(d, s, z, l) is L-Lipschitz a.e. in its second argument, for some arbitrary∞ > L ≥ 0;
(OV) For all d ∈ {0, 1}, there exist some δ ∈ (0, 1) such that ec
(
d, s,x, z, l
)
∈ (δ, 1− δ) for
all s ≤ l, for all z ∈ Z, l ∈ Z,x ∈ Z l × Zl.
(TC) For Γ21,Γ
2
2 <∞, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},
E
[
supd∈{0,1},s≤|Ni|r(d, s, Zi, |Ni|, εi)3
∣∣∣A] < Γ21, a.s.
E
[
supd∈{0,1}m
c(d, 0, Zi, |Ni|)3
∣∣∣A] < Γ22, a.s.
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(VC) pi belongs to a function class of measurable functions12 Π, where Π has finite VC
dimension.13
Condition (LP) is satisfied for any bounded mc(.)14, but it also accomodates for un-
bounded mc(.). Remarkably, the condition is agnostic on the true conditional mean func-
tion m(.).
Condition (OV) is the usual overlap condition, often imposed in the causal inference
literature. Here we impose the condition on the pseudo-true propensity score, and therefore
it always guaranteed when the propensity score is constructed after trimming (Crump et al.,
2009). Under (OV), we let δ0 be the largest constant such that e
c
(
d, 0,x, z, l
)
∈ (δ0, 1−δ0),
for all z ∈ Z, l ∈ Z,x ∈ Z l ×Zl. Such constant is always larger than δ by construction. In
the presence of a large maximum degree, additional restrictions on the number of neighbors’
exposures can guarantee strict overlap similarly to what discussed in Remark 7.
Condition (TC) imposes moment conditions on the outcome, and similar or stronger
conditions are often assumed in the statistical treatment choice literature (Zhou et al.,
2018; Nie et al., 2019; Kitagawa and Tetenov, 2017).
Condition (VC) imposes restrictions on the geometric complexity of the function class
of interest. It is commonly assumed in the literature on empirical welfare maximization,
and examples include Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) and Athey and Wager (2017), among
others. Condition (VC) is motivated by restrictions that policymakers often impose: treat-
ment allocation rules must be simple and easy to communicate to the general public, and
they can often only depend on a small subset of variables. Mbakop and Tabord-Meehan
(2016) provides several examples under which the assumption holds.
In this paper, we let observations be locally dependent. The amount of dependence is
captured by the maximum number of connections between focal units to the first, second,
and third-degree neighbors.
Definition 5.1. Let Nn,M denote the maximum degree of units {1, ..., n} and their neigh-
bors up to Mth degree.
12 In this paper, we do not impose pointwise measurability of Π, but we only require the measurability of
each function pi ∈ Π. On the other hand, since in such a case the pointwise supremum may not be necessarily
measurable for the processes of interest (such as |Wn(pi,mc, ec)−W (pi)|), we refer to the supremum function
as the lattice supremum whose measurability is guaranteed by Lemma 2.6 in Haj lasz and Maly` (2002), under
the conditions stated. The definition of lattice supremum is the following: for a probability space, (Ω,F ,P),
the lattice supremum as defined in Haj lasz and Maly` (2002) is a family of measurable functions on Ω, defined
as the supremum with respect to the ordering, neglecting sets of measure zero. Whenever the function class
of interest is countable, the lattice supremum corresponds to the pointwise supremum.
13The VC dimension denotes the cardinality of the largest set of points that the function pi can shatter.
The VC dimension is commonly used to measure the complexity of a class, see for example Devroye et al.
(2013).
14To see why the claim hold, let mc(d, S, Zi) < B a.e. Since S ∈ Z, |mc(d, S, Zi) − mc(d, S′, Zi)| ≤
B|S − S′|. In fact, |S − S′| > 1 for all S 6= S′. Therefore the function is Lipschitz with constant B.
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Intuitively, Nn,M provides information on the effect of the network topology on the
regret bound, and it captures the degree of dependence in the network. Under bounded
degree Nn,M ≤ J <∞ uniformly in the sample size for some 0 ≤ J <∞.
In our first result, we discuss theoretical guarantees for oracle case where the policy
function maximizes W aipwn (pi,mc, ec), for some arbitrary functions mc and ec. We then
relate the following to the case where such functions must be estimated. In the first
theorem we discuss properties of the policy function that maximizes the oracle double-
robust welfare, which is defined as
pˆiaipwmc,ec ∈ arg max
pi∈Π
W aipwn (pi,m
c, ec).
Theorem 5.1. (Oracle Regret) Let Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.1 hold. Assume that
either (or both) (i) mc(.) = m(.) and/or (ii) both ec(.) = e(.). Then,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmc,ec)
]
≤ (Γ1 + Γ2)C¯
δ
(
L+
L+ 1
δ20
)
E[NM+1n,M−1]
√
VC(Π)
n
+ 2KΠ(n),
for a constant C¯ < ∞ independent of the sample size and the population size of target
units.
Before formally discussing the theorem, we provide two important corollaries in the
following lines.
Corollary. (Identically Distributed Units) Suppose that |Ni| ≤ J <∞ for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}
and that KΠ(n) = 0 (e.g., sample and target units are drawn from the same population)
and conditions in the previous theorem hold. Then
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmc,ec)
]
≤ C¯
√
VC(Π)/n,
for a constant C¯ that does not depend on the sample size and target units.
Corollary. (Known Propensity Score) Let pˆiipw ∈ arg maxpi∈ΠW ipwn (pi, e) for known propen-
sity score and let the conditions in the above corollary hold. Then
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiipw)
]
≤ C¯
√
VC(Π)/n
for a constant C¯ that does not depend on the sample size and target units.
The proof of the theorem is in the Appendix. Theorem 5.1 provides a non-asymptotic
upper bound on the regret, and it is the first result of this type under network interference.
The theorem is double robust to misspecification of mc and 1/ec. The first corollary shows
that the bound scales at rate 1/
√
n, which has been shown to be optimal in the i.i.d. with
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no-interference setting (Athey and Wager, 2017), under bounded maximum degree. The
second corollary provides regret guarantees when researchers maximize the welfare, under
known propensity score.
Theorem 5.1 imposes the following conditions: (i) one-degree interference, (ii) iden-
tically distributed unobservable characteristics εi, (iii) locally dependent units, and (iv)
the unconfoundeness condition. Condition (i), (ii), and (iv) guarantee that W aipwn is an
unbiased estimated of the welfare on the in-sample units, namely that
E
[
W aipwn (pi,m
c, ec)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
m
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|
)]
,
under correct specification of either the conditional mean function or the propensity score.
The derivation of the theorem consists in deriving uniform bounds on the empirical
process |W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)−W (pi)|.
Since target and sampled units may be drawn from different populations, Wn(pi,m
c, ec),
which denotes the in-sample welfare, may not be centered around the target welfare W (pi).
Therefore, the first step consists in upper bounding the supremum of the empirical process
of interest as follows:
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)−W (pi)∣∣∣
= sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣E[W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)]−W aipwn (pi,mc, ec) +W (pi)− E[W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)]∣∣∣
≤ sup
p˜i∈Π
∣∣∣E[W aipwn (p˜i,mc, ec)]−W (p˜i)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣E[W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)]−W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
.
(19)
The term (A) is KΠ(n) and it is equal to zero whenever the in-sample units are drawn
from the same population of the target units. The term (B) instead captures the distance
between the sample welfare and its expectation, over all the policy functions in the class
Π. The term (B) is bounded by the Rademacher complexity of a function class that is
constructed from a composition of the conditional mean and propensity score function with
the policy function that assigns treatments to the individual and to its neighbors. The local
dependence assumption is used to control the Rademacher complexity, as a function of the
maximum degree.
The derivation relies on new arguments with respect to previous literature on statistical
treatment choice, since (i) the welfare depends on an arbitrary composition of functions,
and (ii) observations are locally dependent, and only weak moment conditions are imposed.
To address the first issue, we extend the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction inequality to prod-
ucts of functions and indicators, and we derive a series of results that exploit Lipschitz
continuity and the moment condition to guarantee the applicability of this extension. We
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then provide bounds on the empirical Rademacher average of the function class of inter-
est. The proof deals with local dependence (Assumption 3.3) by partitioning units into
groups of conditional independent observations. We bound the Rademacher complexity
within each group of independent but not necessarily identically distributed observations,
and we exploit properties of the chromatic number to guarantee bounds in terms of the
maximum degree. The proof is split into several lemmas contained in the Appendix. In
the following corollary, we discuss the rate of convergence for the AIPW estimator with
known propensity score and with the conditional mean function being estimated on an
independent sample. Alternative sample splitting rules are discussed in later paragraphs.
Corollary. (Sample Splitting 1) Let pˆisaipwmˆc,e ∈ arg maxpi∈Π Wˆ aipwn (pi, mˆc, e), where e(.) is
the known propensity score and mˆc(.) is estimated on an hold-out and independent sample.
Let the conditions in Theorem 5.1 hold. Suppose that |Ni| ≤ J < ∞ for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}
and that KΠ(n) = 0. Then
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆisaipwmˆc,e )
]
≤ C¯
√
VC(Π)
n
,
for a finite constant C¯ which does not depend on the sample size and the size of the target
units.
5.1 Estimation Error of Nuisance Functions under Lack of Mutual Inde-
pendence
In this subsection, we discuss the case where mˆc and/or eˆc are estimated on the same
sample that is used to compute the policy function. We do not discuss sample splitting
procedures, and we allow for a lack of mutual independence across observations. In the
next sub-section, we then discuss improvements in the rate of convergence under stronger
independence conditions. The following condition is imposed.
Assumption 5.2. (Convergence rate to pseudo-true values) For some ξ1, ξ2 > 0,
E
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
d∈{0,1},s≤|Ni|
∣∣∣mˆc(d, s, Zi, |Ni|)−mc(d, s, Zi, |Ni|)∣∣∣] = O(1/nξ1).
E
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
d∈{0,1},s≤|Ni|
∣∣∣(Yi −mc(d, s, Zi, |Ni|))(ec(d, s,Oi)− eˆc(d, s,Oi))∣∣∣] = O(1/nξ2).
(20)
where Oi = (Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|).
Assumption 5.2 imposes conditions on the convergence rate of mˆc to its pseudo-true
value mc and the convergence rate of eˆc to the pseudo true ec. Parametric convergence
rate for the least squares estimator can be guaranteed under cross-sectional dependence by
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imposing conditions on the maximum degree to be bounded. Convergence rate for penalized
regression under cross-sectional dependence can instead be found in He and Song (2018)
and Chernozhukov et al. (2018) among others. Estimation via method of moments, that
satisfy the high-level conditions in Hansen (1982) also guarantees parametric convergence
rates 1/
√
n of the estimators of interest.
We now aim to provide guarantee for the policy function
pˆiaipwmˆc,eˆc ∈ arg maxpi∈Π Wˆ
aipw
n (pi, mˆ
c, eˆc),
which is constructed using the estimated conditional mean function and propensity score.
Theorem 5.2. Let Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.1, 5.2 hold. Assume that either
mc(.) = m(.) or ec(.) = e(.) and KΠ(n) = 0 (e.g., conditions in Lemma 3.3 hold). Assume
in addition that eˆc is uniformly bounded (e.g., trimming is used). Then,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmˆc,eˆc)
]
≤ (Γ1 + Γ2)C¯
δ
(
L+
L+ 1
δ20
)
E[NM+1n,M−1]
√
VC(Π)
n
+O
(
1/nξ
)
,
where ξ = min{ξ1, ξ2}, for a constant C¯ < ∞ independent of the sample size and target
units.
Theorem 5.2 provides uniform bound on the regret, and it is double robust to correct
specification of the conditional mean and the propensity score. The result of the theorem
depends on the rate of convergence of eˆc and mˆc to their pseudo-true value. For parametric
estimators of the conditional mean and the propensity score and bounded degree, the regret
bounds scale at rate 1/
√
n.
Remark 8. (Misspecification) Let KΠ(n,mc, ec) = suppi∈Π
∣∣∣E[Wn(pi,mc, ec)−Wn(pi,m, e)]∣∣∣
denote the misspecification error when both mc and ec are misspecified. Following the same
argument in Equation (19), whenever both mc and ec are wrongly specified, Theorem 5.1,
5.2 hold for KΠ(n) being replaced by KΠ(n) +KΠ(n,mc, ec).
5.2 Rate Improvements of Double Robust Methods under Dependence
Graph Assumption
Next, we turn to discuss improvements in rates of convergence under stronger independence
conditions. In particular, the following assumption is stated.
Assumption 5.3. (Dependency Graph) Let {Wj , j ∈ {1, ...,∞}} denote an arbitrary set
of possibly unobserved mutually independent random variables. For each i ∈ {1, ..., n} let
Si ⊂ {1, ...,∞} denote an arbitrary set of such random variables. Let Vi = (Zi, |Ni|, εi) ∈ V.
Suppose that we can write Vi : WSi 7→ V depending on some arbitrary WSi, for each
i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Suppose in addition that maxi∈{1,...,n} |j : Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅| ≤ m < ∞, where
|j : Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅| denotes the cardinality of the set of units being dependent with Vi.
25
Assumption 5.3 is common in the literature on dependency graph (e.g., Janson (2004),
Paulin (2012)). Assumption 5.3 states the following conditions: covariates, number of
neighbors and unobservables characteristics are mutually independent for individuals being
distant enough in the dependency graph.
Differently from the previous results, for estimation, we require that that the researcher
knows the level of dependence across sample units, and their entire network, while such
condition is not imposed on the target sample. In the example of Cai et al. (2015), this is
satisfied if researchers collect the entire network information in all villages participating in
the experiment, whereas the network information from the target villages is not necessarily
observed.
Under the above condition, we propose a modification of the cross-fitting algorithm
(Chernozhukov et al., 2018), to account for the local dependence of observations, and a
possibly fully connected network. The procedure reads as follows.
Algorithm 1 : Network Cross-Fitting
1. Create K folds and assign to each fold individuals that are not dependent under
Assumption 5.3;
2. For each unit j in fold k, estimate the conditional mean, and the propensity score
using all observations within the fold k only, with the exception of observation j.
To the best of our knowledge, Algorithm 1 is novel to the literature on network interference.
The key intuition of the above algorithm is to construct folds of independent observations
and estimate via leave-one-out each conditional mean within each fold. Altnernative algo-
rithmic procedures have been proposed for multi-way and clustered datasets (Chiang et al.,
2019), whereas here we consider the different setting of networked observations, which re-
quires using chromatic properties of the network in the construction of the sample splitting
procedure.
In the following assumption, we discuss conditions on the convergence rate of the pro-
posed procedure.
Assumption 5.4. Assume that for each d ∈ {0, 1}, s ∈ Z, the following holds
An × Bn = O(n−2v), (21)
for some v ≥ 1/2, where
An = 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
sup
d,s
∣∣∣mˆc(d, s, Zi, |Ni|)−m(d, s, Zi, |Ni|)∣∣∣]
Bn = 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
sup
d,s
∣∣∣eˆc(d, s, Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|)− e(d, s, Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|)∣∣∣].
(22)
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Assume in addition that for a universal constant c <∞, for n ≥ N˜ , for some N˜
sup
d,s,z,l
∣∣∣mˆc(d, s, z, l)−m(d, s, z, l)∣∣∣ ≤ c, sup
d,s,v,z,l
∣∣∣1/eˆc(d, s, v, z, l)− 1/e(d, s, v, z, l)∣∣∣ ≤ 2/δ2.
(23)
Assumption 5.4 imposes conditions on the product of the convergence rate of the es-
timator to the true conditional mean and propensity score function, in the same spirit of
standard conditions in the i.i.d. setting (e.g., Farrell (2015)). Under the above conditions,
we can state the following theorem. The proof is contained in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.3. Let Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 hold, with mc =
m, ec = e. Assume that |Ni| ≤ M < ∞ for all i. Let estimation being performed as in
Algorithm 1. Then, for n ≥ N˜ ,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmˆc,eˆc)
]
≤ C¯
√
VC(Π)
n
+ 2KΠ(n)
C¯ <∞ independent of the sample size and target units.
6 Optimization under Interference
In this section we discuss the optimization procedure. For the sake of brevity, we consider
the optimization of the welfare Wˆ aipwn (pi,mc, ec). The argument works as follows.
Firstly, we define the estimated effect of assigning to unit i treatment d, after treating
s of its neighbors. For the double robust method, such quantity is defined as
gi(d, s) =
1{∑k∈Ni Dk = s,Di = d}
ec
(
d, s, Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) (Yi −mc(d, s, Zi, |Ni|))+mc(d, s, Zi, |Ni|), (24)
where we omit the dependence with mc and ec for sake of brevity. Secondly, we define
Ii(pi, h) = 1{
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk) = h}
to be the indicator of whether h neighbors of individual i have been treated under policy
pi. We can write(
gi(1, h)pi(Xi) + gi(0, h)(1− pi(Xi))
)
Ii(pi, h) =
{
gi(pi(Xi), h) if h =
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk)
0, otherwise.
Therefore, after trivial rearrengement, we have that
|Ni|∑
h=0
(gi(1, h)− gi(0, h))pi(Xi)Ii(pi, h) + Ii(pi, h)gi(0, h) = gi
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk)
)
. (25)
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The equation above rewrites the estimated treatment effect on unit i, obtained after
implementing policy pi, as a sum of effects obtained by treating zero to all neighbors
of i. Each element in the sum is weighted by the indicator Ii(pi, h), and only one of such
indicators is equal to one. We can therefore rewrite the target objective function as follows.
W aipwn (pi,m
c, ec) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Ni|∑
h=0
(gi(1, h)− gi(0, h))pi(Xi)Ii(pi, h) + Ii(pi, h)gi(0, h). (26)
Next, we define n variables pi that denote the treatment assignment of each unit, after
restricting the policy function in the function class of interest. Namely, we let
pi = pi(Xi), pi ∈ Π.
For example, for policy functions of the form pi(Xi) = 1{X>i β ≥ 0}, β ∈ B, similarly to
Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) we write
X>i β
|Ci| < pi ≤
X>i β
|Ci| + 1, Ci > supβ∈B|X
>
i β|, pi ∈ {0, 1}, (27)
where pi is equal to one if X
>
i β is positive and zero otherwise.
We now introduce new variables that account for the differences induced by the problem
under consideration. We define the following variables:
ti,h,1 = 1{
∑
k∈Ni
pk ≥ h}, ti,h,2 = 1{
∑
k∈Ni
pk ≤ h}, h ∈ {0, ...., |Ni|}.
The first variable is one if at least h neighbors are treated, and the second variable is
one if at most h neighbors are treated. We aim to define ti,h,1, ti,h,2 using linear constraints.
We observe that the variable ti,h,1 can be equivalently be defined as
(
∑
k Ai,kpk − h)
|Ni|+ 1 < ti,h,1 ≤
(
∑
k Ai,kpk − h)
|Ni|+ 1 + 1, ti,h,1 ∈ {0, 1}. (28)
The above equation holds for the following reason. Suppose that h <
∑
k Ai,kpk. Since
(
∑
k Ai,kpk−h)
|Ni|+1 < 0, the left-hand side of the inequality is negative and the right hand side is
positive and strictly smaller than one. Since ti,h,1 is constrained to be either zero or one,
in such case, it is set to be zero. Suppose now that h ≥∑k Ai,kpk. Then the left-hand side
is bounded from below by zero, and the right-hand side is bounded from below by one.
Therefore ti,h,1 is set to be one. Similarly, we can write
(h−∑k Ai,kpk)
|Ni|+ 1 < ti,h,2 ≤
(h−∑k Ai,kpk)
|Ni|+ 1 + 1, ti,h,2 ∈ {0, 1}. (29)
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In the following step, we aim to use ti,h,1 and ti,h,2 to recover the indicator Ii(pi, h). By
definition,
ti,h,1 + ti,h,2 =
{
1 if and only if
∑
k∈Ni pk 6= h
2 otherwise .
(30)
Therefore, we obtain that
ti,h,1 + ti,h,2 − 1 = Ii(pi, h).
We now can write the objective function to be
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Ni|∑
h=0
(gi(1, h)− gi(0, h))pi(ti,h,1 + ti,h,2 − 1) + (ti,h,1 + ti,h,2 − 1)gi(0, h). (31)
The above objective function leads to a quadratic mixed integer program. On the other
hand, quadratic programs can be computationally expensive to solve. We write the problem
as a mixed-integer linear program introducing one additional set variables, that we call ui,h
for h ∈ {0, ..., |Ni|}. Notice first that we can write
pi(ti,h,1 + ti,h,2 − 1) = pi × ti,h,1 × ti,h,2 (32)
since (ti,h,1 + ti,h,2 − 1) is equal to one if both variables are ones and zero if either of the
two variables are ones and the other is zero. The case where both variables are zero never
occurs by construction. Therefore we can write
pi + ti,h,1 + ti,h,2
3
− 1 < ui,h ≤ pi + ti,h,1 + ti,h,2
3
, ui,h ∈ {0, 1}. (33)
We provide the complete formulation below.
max
{ui,h},{pi},{ti,1,h,ti,2,h},β∈B
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Ni|∑
h=0
(gi(1, h)− gi(0, h))ui,h + gi(0, h)(ti,h,1 + ti,h,2 − 1)
(34)
under the constraints:
(A) pi = pi(Xi), pi ∈ Π
(B)
pi + ti,h,1 + ti,h,2
3
− 1 < ui,h ≤ pi + ti,h,1 + ti,h,2
3
, ui,h ∈ {0, 1} ∀h ∈ {0, ..., |Ni|},
(C)
(
∑
k Ai,kpk − h)
|Ni|+ 1 < ti,h,1 ≤
(
∑
k Ai,kpk − h)
|Ni|+ 1 + 1, ti,h,1 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀h ∈ {0, ..., |Ni|}
(D)
(h−∑k Ai,kpk)
|Ni|+ 1 < ti,h,2 ≤
(h−∑k Ai,kpk)
|Ni|+ 1 + 1, ti,h,2 ∈ {0, 1}, ∀h ∈ {0, ...., |Ni|}.
(35)
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The first constraint can be replaced by methods discussed in previous literature for max-
imum score or optimal trees (Florios and Skouras, 2008; Bertsimas and Dunn, 2017),
whereas the additional constraints are motivated by the presence of interference. In the
presence of capacity constraints, the problem can be formulated as above, after adding an
additional linear constraints on the maximum number of treated units. Whereas the prob-
lem contains a large set of variables, most of these variables are binary, which drastically
reduces the computational time of the problem.15 Whenever units have no-neighbors, the
objective function is proportional to the one discussed in Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018)
under no interference. This follows from the fact that under no interference the second
component in the objective function is a constant and the first component only depends
on the individual treatment allocation. Therefore, the formulation provided generalizes
the MILP formulation to the case of interference. In the next theorem, we formalize the
argument discussed in the above lines.
Theorem 6.1. The function pi that solves the optimization problem in Equation (34) under
the constraints in Equation (35) is equivalent to argmaxpi∈ΠW
aipw
n (pi,mc, ec).
Clearly, the above theorem is true for any function mc, ec regardless of whether it is
estimated or not. A different and possibly faster optimization method can be constructed
by first optimizing over n binary variables without imposing any constraint on the policy,
using pattern search algorithms for optimization, and second, train any classification algo-
rithm of interest on the estimated binary assignments. On the other hand, we warn the
readers that our formal results are valid only for solutions that are exact up to an error of
order O(1/n1/2).
7 Higher Order Interference
This section aims to provide tools to researchers to estimate optimal policies when higher-
order interference occurs. In this section, we discuss the case of two-degree interference.
The generalization to K-degree interference follows similarly to what discussed in this
section.
7.1 Notation
For a given A, we denote the set of second degree neighbors of individual i as Ni,2(A). The
set Ni,2(A) contains each element j 6= i such that there exists a connecting path of length
two between j and i, repeated by the number of such paths.
15In our simulations with 200 observations the computational of each problem is between one or two
hours, whereas it takes between a few minutes with 100 observations. In our empirical application, the
solution to the problem using a few thousands of observations takes a couple of days to run on a personal
laptot.
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Example 7.1. Consider Figure 3 for an illustrative example. The set of first order degree
of vertex V 1 is the set {V 6, V 2, V 3}. The set of second order degree neighbors of vertex
V 1 is instead {V 2, V 3, V 4, V 5} since vertex V 1 has a path of length two connecting to V 2
and similarly to V 3.
Formally, for a given adjacency matrix A we let Ni,2(A) = {j|kj,i(A)| : kj,i(A) = {k 6∈
{j} ∪ {i} : A(i,k)A(k,j) 6= 0}}, the set containing second degree neighbors, where each
element j has multiplicity |kj,i(A)|. The multiplicity of each second degree neighbor permits
to account for treatment effects amplifyied by the presence of cliques (i.e., cycles) in the
network.
We will refer to the set of Ni, Ni,2 by omitting their dependence on the adjacency
matrix A whenever possible. We will assume that the first and second-degree neighbors
are observable. We also assume that researchers observe the treatment assignment Di of
each unit, covariates of individuals, Zi, that may also contain sufficient statistics of first and
second degree neighbors’ statistics. We let the policy function depend on characteristics
Xi ⊆ (Zi, |Ni|, |Ni,2|), Xi ∈ X .
Assumption 7.1. Assume that researchers randomly sample n units and, for each unit,
they observe the vector
(
Yi, Zi, Zj∈Ni , Zj∈Ni,2 , Di, Dj∈Ni , Dj∈Ni,2 , Ni, Ni,2
)
.
The assumption above is stronger than the sampling condition stated under one-degree
interference. It requires that researchers observe first and second-order degree neighbors
of focal units.
7.2 Interference
We state the following interference model: potential outcomes depend only on their treat-
ment assignment, on the number of treated first-degree neighbors, on the number of treated
second-degree neighbors (times their multiplicity), on their degree centrality as well as on
the number of second-degree neighbors. We let spillover effects generated from treatments
assigned to second-degree neighbors differ from the effects generated by treatments as-
signed to first degree neighbors. In the next example we discuss outcomes of the form
Yi = r
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk,
∑
k∈Ni,2
Dk, Zi, |Ni|, |Ni,2|, εi
)
.
as a function of first and second degree treated neighbors.
Example 7.2. Consider Figure 3. Here, V 1 is treated, and the other units are under
control. For notational convenience let Zi = ∅. Therefore the potential outcome is denoted
as
r(d, s1, s2, |Ni|, |Ni,2|, εi).
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The effect of treating vertex V 1 spill-overs on its first degree and second-degree neighbors.
Consider for instance vertex V 6. The set of first-degree neighbors of V 6 is {V 1}. The set
of second order degree neighbors of V 6 is {V 2, V 3}. Since none of its second order degree
neighbors is treated, the potential outcome of V 6 is written as
r(0, 1, 0, 1, 2, εV 6).
Consider instead V 2. The set of first-degree neighbors is {V 1, V 3, V 5} and the set of second
order degree neighbors is {V 6, V 1, V 3, V 4}. Therefore V 2 is exposed to the treatment of
V 1 through two effects: the spillover effect that propagates from V 1 to V 2 and the spillover
effect that propagates from V 1 to V 3 to V 2. The potential outcome of V 2 is written as
r(0, 1, 1, 3, 4, εV 2).
We formalize the interference model below.
Assumption 7.2. (Two-Degrees Interference Model) For all unit i, there exist a function
r(.) such that
Yi = r
(
Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk,
∑
k∈Ni,2
Dk, Zi, |Ni|, |Ni,2|, εi
)
almost surely, where Ni,2 = {j|kj,i(A)| : kj,i(A) = {k 6∈ {j} ∪ {i} : A(i,k)A(k,j) 6= 0}}.
Assumption 7.2 generalizes Assumption 3.1 to two-degrees interference. It assumes the
potential outcome of each unit only depends on its treatment status, the number of first
degree neighbors, the number of second-degree neighbors, the number of treated first-degree
neighbors and the number of treated second-degree neighbors.
7.3 Identification and Estimation
In the same spirit of Section 3, we state the conditions where the network is let to be
random. For notational convenience, we state the distributional assumptions in terms of
the sets Ni and Ni,2 and not the adjacency matrix A.
Assumption 7.3. Let the following holds.
(ID) For all (i, j) ∈ {1, ..., n}2,
P (εi ≤ x|Zi = z, |Ni| = l, |Ni,2| = l2) = P (εj ≤ x|Zj = z, |Nj | = l, |Nj,2| = l2)
for all z ∈ Z, l, l2 ∈ Z, x ∈ R.
(UN1) For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, Di = fD(Zi, εDi) where εDi are i.i.d. and independent of
observables and unobservables.
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V1
V2
V3 V4
V5V6
treated unit
unit with one first and one second order degree treated neighbor
unit with only one second order degree treated neighbor
unit with only one first degree treated neighbor
Figure 2: Example of diffusion with two-degree interference. Only V 1 is exposed to the
treatment in the example. The remaining colors denote the status of neighbors’ treatments
for the other units. The spillover effect generated on V 6 is different from the one generated
on V 2 and V 3 due to the presence of a clique. The reader might refer to the discussion in
Example 7.2.
(UN2) For all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, εi ⊥
(
Ni, Zj∈Ni , Ni,2, Zj∈Ni,2 , Ni∈Ni , Ni∈Ni,2
)∣∣∣Zi, |Ni|, |Ni,2|.
Condition (ID) is equivalent to Assumption 3.2 and it permits identifiability of the con-
ditional mean function of sampled units. Condition (UN1) is the standard unconfoundeness
condition, which states that treatment assignments are randomized based on covariates Zi.
We also allow randomization based on the number of first and second degree neighbors.
i.i.d. of εDi permits estimability of the propensity score similarly to what discussed under
one degree interference. Condition (UN2) imposes unconfoundeness of the unobservable
characteristics with the network (network exogeneity) and neighbors’ covariates. The latter
condition is imposed to guarantee that non-parametric estimators that use the propensity
score can be used for estimation.
Based on the previous assumption we can now formalize the definition of the conditional
mean function and the propensity score.
Definition 7.1. (Conditional Mean) Under Assumption 7.2 and Assumption 7.3 the con-
ditional mean function under two degree interference is
m2(d, s1, s2, z, l, l2) = E
[
r
(
d, s1, s2, Zi, |Ni| = l, |Ni,2| = l2, εi
)∣∣∣Zi = z]
as a function of (d, s1, s2, z, l, l2) only.
The second causal estimand of interest is the propensity score.
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Definition 7.2. (Propensity Score) Under Assumption 7.3 the propensity score is defined
as
e2(d, s1, s2,x1,x2, z, l, l2) = P
(
Di = d,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk = s1,
∑
k∈Ni,2
Dk = s2
∣∣∣Vi(x1,x2, z, l, l2))
Vi(x1,x2, z, l, l2) = {Zk∈Ni = x1, Zk∈Ni,2 = x2, Zi = z, |Ni| = l, |Ni,2| = l2}
Assumption 7.3 guarantees that the propensity score is not unit-specific. The expres-
sion above can be decomposed as a sum of products of marginal conditional probabilities,
similarly to what discussed in Equation (12) under one degree interference. Namely,
e2(d, s1, s2,x1,x2, z, l, l2) = P
(
Di = d|Zi = z
)
×( ∑
u1,...,u|Ni|:
∑
v uv=s1
l∏
k=1
P
(
D
N
(k)
i
= uk
∣∣∣Z
N
(k)
i
= xk,.1
))
×
( ∑
u1,...,u|Ni,2|:
∑
v uv=s2
l2∏
k=1
P
(
D
N
(k)
i,2
= uk
∣∣∣Z
N
(k)
i,2
= xk,.2
))
,
(36)
which can be estimated by plugging-in the conditional marginal probabilities obtained via
maximum likelihood.
Remark 9. Similarly to what discussed in 7, the researchers may imposed restrictions on
the number of exposure of neighbors. In such a case, the propensity score defines as sums
of the above probabilities, possibly leading to improvements in overlap.
The welfare function on a given target population I is now defined as
W2(pi) =
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
E
[
m2
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk),
∑
k∈Ni,2
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, |Ni,2|
)]
. (37)
Estimation can be performed similarly to what discussed in Section 4 under one degree
interference. For instance the estimated welfare obtained by using the conditional mean
function only is defined as
Wˆn,2(pi) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
mˆ2
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk),
∑
k∈Ni,2
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|, |Ni,2|
)
. (38)
Similarly, we can construct non-parametric and double robust estimates based on the
definition of the propensity score.
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8 Extensions
8.1 Capacity Constraints
Capacity constraints often arise in practice. In this subsection, we discuss optimal treat-
ment allocation under capacity constraints. We assume that Xi ∼ FX have the same
marginal distribution for each unit in the target and sample population.
We are interested in solving the optimization problem of the form:
maxpi∈Π W aipwn (pi,m
c, ec), s.t.
∫
x∈X
pi(x)dFX(x) ≤ K (39)
where K ∈ (0, 1] denotes the maximum fraction of treated units. Whenever FX is known
to the researcher, all the previous theoretical results directly extend also to this case. On
the other hand, researchers do not always know the density FX . Here, we discuss the case
where the constraint is imposed on the sample analog 1n
∑n
i=1 pi(Xi).
In this section, we discuss capacity constraints using concentration arguments and we
quantify such an error in the presence of locally dependent random variables. Further
discussion on capacity constraints for i.i.d. data can be found in Kitagawa and Tetenov
(2018), Bhattacharya and Dupas (2012), Adusumilli et al. (2019), whereas here we differ-
ently account for the network structure. To achieve this goal, we impose conditions on the
dependence of the random variables used for the targeting exercise.
Assumption 8.1. (Local Dependence 2) Let {Wi, i ∈ {1, ...,∞}} denote an arbitrary set
of possibly unobserved independent random variables. For each i ∈ {1, ..., n} let Si ⊂
{1, ...,∞} denote an arbitrary set of such random variables. Suppose that we can write
Xi : WSi 7→ X depending on some arbitrary WSi. Suppose in addition that maxi∈{1,...,n} |j :
Si∩Sj 6= ∅| ≤ m <∞, where |j : Si∩Sj 6= ∅| denotes the cardinality of the set of dependent
Xi.
The condition is similar to what discussed in Assumption 5.3, whereas here it is only
imposed on variables Xi. Under Assumption 8.1, we show that the constraint equation
concentrates uniformly over all possible policies around its expectation at an exponential
rate. Such result guarantees control on the number of treated units also once the policy is
scaled at the population level.
Proposition 8.1. Suppose that Assumption 8.1 holds and Xi are identically distributed.
Assume that Π has finite VC-dimension. Then there exists a universal constant C¯ such
that with probability at least 1− γ,
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)−
∫
x∈X
pi(x)dFX(x)
∣∣∣ ≤ C¯√VC(Π)/n+ 2m√log(2/γ)/n (40)
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Proposition 8.1 guarantees non-asymptotic probability bound on the in-sample capacity
constraint. Intuitively, it shows that the sample analog constraint converges to the target
constraint at the optimal rate, for the bounded degree, uniformly on the function class, also
under local dependence. The proof of the proposition combines concentration argument
for Lipschitz functions discussed in Paulin (2012) with uniform bounds on the Rademacher
complexity of the number of sampled units under treatment and it is contained in the
Appendix.
8.2 Different Target and Sampled Units
As discussed in Section 5, whenever the sampled and target units are drawn from the same
super-populations, for example in Lemma 3.3, the regret scales at rate 1/
√
n for a bounded
degree. On the other hand, the distribution of edges and covariates of the target population
may differ from the sampled ones. In this subsection, we provide characterizations of the
regret in this context. The following condition is imposed.
Assumption 8.2. Assume that target and sample units follow the following laws:
(Zi, Xk∈Ni)
∣∣∣|Ni| ∼ Fs,|Ni|, |Ni| ∼ Gs ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},
and
(Zi, Xk∈Ni)
∣∣∣|Ni| ∼ Ft,|Ni|, , |Ni| ∼ Gt ∀ i ∈ I.
Assume in addition that Assumption 3.2, 3.3 and Condition (B) in Assumption 3.4 hold
for all sampled as well as for the target units.
Assumption 8.2 states that the distributions of individual covariates, neighbors’ co-
variates and number of neighbors differs across the target and sampled units only. The
assumption reads as follows: the joint distribution of (Zi, Xk∈Ni), given the degree |Ni| is
the same across units having the same degree and being in the same population (either
target or sampled population) and similarly the marginal distribution of |Ni|, whereas such
distributions may be different between target and sampled units.
Under the second condition in Assumption 8.2 the conditional mean function is the same
on target and sampled units, whereas the distribution of covariates and network may differ.
We define fs,|Ni|, ft,|Ni| the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivatives of Fs,|Ni|, Ft,|Ni|, of
sampled and target units with respect to a common dominating measure on Z × X |Ni|
and similarly gs, gt the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivatives of Gs, Gt.
16 Then, we
impose the following condition:
Assumption 8.3. Assume that ft,|Ni|(Zi, Xk∈Ni)gt(|Ni|) = ρ(Zi, Xk∈Ni , |Ni|)fs,|Ni|(Zi, Xk∈Ni)gs(|Ni|),
with ρ(Zi, Xk∈Ni , |Ni|) ≤ ρ¯ <∞ almost surely.
16Since |Ni| is discrete, gs(l), gt(l) corresponds to the probability of the number of neighbors being equal
to l.
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Assumption 8.3 follows similarly to Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018), where the ratio of
the two densities is assumed to be bounded almost surely. The empirical welfare criterion
is constructed as follows:
W tn(pi,m
c, ec) =
En
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) (Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))× ρ(Zi, Xk∈Ni , |Ni|)]
+ En
[
mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)ρ(Zi, Xk∈Ni , |Ni|)
]
,
(41)
where En denotes the empirical expectation. Intuitively, the empirical welfare reweights
sampled observations by the ratio of the densitites with respect to the target units. When-
ever either mc or ec are correctly specified, by the law of iterated expectations, by first
conditioning on (Zi, Xk∈Ni , |Ni|), we obtain that
E[W tn(pi,mc, ec)] = W (pi) (42)
where W (pi) denotes the welfare on target units. The following regret bound is guaranteed
to hold in such a setting.
Theorem 8.2. Let Assumption 8.2, 8.3 hold. Then under conditions in Theorem 5.1, we
obtain that for pˆiaipwmc,ec maximizing Equation (41),
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmc,ec)
]
≤ ρ¯2 (Γ1 + Γ2)C¯v
δ
(
ρ¯L+
ρ¯L+ 1
δ20
)
E[NM+1n,M−1]
√
VC(Π)
n
,
for a constant C¯ < ∞ independent of the sample size and the population size of target
units.
The proof is discussed in Appendix E.1.
Theorem 8.2 showcases that whenever the distribution on the target units is known to
researchers, regret guarantees can be achieved after appropriately changing the objective
function.
On the other hand, the density of target units may be unknown to researchers. In
such a case, results in Section 5 also depend on the target-sample discrepancy KΠ(n).
In the following lines, we discuss the estimation of upper bounds for such an object. In
particular, whenever Ft, Gt are unknown to the researchers, the sample target discrepancy
can be bounded as follows.
KΠ ≤ UΠ
:= sup
pi∈Π,Ft∈Ft,Gt∈Gt
∣∣∣ ∫ m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)dFs,|Ni|dGs − ∫ m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)dFt,|Ni|dGt∣∣∣
(43)
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where Ft,Gt defines a pre-specified function class for Ft. The empirical counterpart is
obtained as
UˆΠ = sup
pi∈Π,Ft∈Ft,Gt∈Gt
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
mˆ
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)
−
∫
mˆ
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)
dFt,|Ni|dGt
∣∣∣.
(44)
Computation can be obtained by optimizing the expression iteratively over the policy
function pi first and the distributions second, and using Monte Carlo methods in the second
step for computing the integral of interest.
9 Empirical Application
We now illustrate the proposed method using data originated from Cai et al. (2015). The
authors study the effect of an information session on insurance adoption on 47 villages in
China, showing that information has not only positive (and heterogenous) direct effects on
adoptions from participants but also significant effects on the friends of the participants. On
the other hand, knowledge of such effects is not sufficient to answer the question: “if we were
to target individuals on new villages, which individuals should we assign to treatment?”.
To answer such a question, we “simulate” the following environment: researchers collect
information on the first 25 villages. They estimate the policy to target individuals in the
remaining villages, which in total are 22.
The data17 contains network information of each individual, and additional information
such as age, gender, the area of rice production, an index denoting the risk aversion of the
participants, and others. The outcome of interest is binary, and it consists of insurance
adoption. We use network data from Cai et al. (2015), and each individual has at most five
connections. The experiment consists of two rounds: two consecutive sets of information
sessions were performed within a few days. The authors assume that spillovers occur only
to individuals participating in the second information session. For estimation purposes, we
represent such a setting by considering an asymmetric adjacency matrix, where individuals
participating in the first round of information sessions are assumed to have no incoming
edges.
We estimate causal effects using a double robust estimation under one-degree interfer-
ence. Estimation of the conditional mean function is performed non-parametrically using
Random Forest (Breiman, 2001), controlling for gender, age, characteristics of the pop-
ulation in the village, the rice area, the level of literacy, the index of risk aversion, the
probability of a climate disaster, education, and the number of friends of the participant.
We also condition on the individual treatment, the percentage of treated neighbors, and
interactions of these with age, rice area, and risk aversion of each individual. We estimate
17Data is accessible at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/
CXDJM0&widget=dataverse@harvard.
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the individual probability of treatment using logistic regression and conditioning on the
above individual-specific covariates. We estimate the propensity score using the expression
in Lemma 3.1. To guarantee overlap, we consider four different neighbors’ exposures, as dis-
cussed in Remark 7, and we impose trimming whenever the joint probability of individual
and neighbors’ treatment is below 10%.
We target individuals with at least one neighbor, and we compare the out-of-sample
performance of the method by only considering the sub-population of units having at least
one connection. We consider two cases: (i) where the target sample contains all individuals
with at least either (or both) one incoming or outcoming connection; (ii) where the target
sample contains individuals with at least one outcoming connection (i.e., individuals par-
ticipating in the first information session are not targeted). Optimization on the training
sample is performed over 1315 observations, and the test sample has either approximately
1300 or 800 observations, depending on each of the two cases.
We consider a linear policy rule of the following form:
pi(Xi) = 1{β0 + ageβ1 + rice areaβ2 + risk adversionβ3 ≥ 0}. (45)
The policy function does not contains network information, and therefore it can also
be implemented when policymaker does not access such information on the remaining 22
target villages. We consider four separate settings, where at most 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% of
individuals are treated.
We compare the proposed method to three competitors: the EWM rule discussed in
Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018), with estimated propensity score as described above, and
same function class as the one described above; the method that targets individuals with
the largest degree (i.e., degree centrality); a random allocation method that assigns at
random a given percentage of individuals to treatment (in this latter case, to estimate the
welfare we replicate such randomization multiple times, and we take the average over the
estimated welfares). The random allocation and the degree centrality allocation treat the
same number of individuals treated under the NEWM method. We collect results on the
out-of-sample welfare in Table 1, for different levels of capacity constraints.
The table reports the percentage improvement of the NEWM with respect to the ran-
dom allocation (first column), EWM method (second column), and the method that targets
individuals with the largest degree (third column). The first panel contains results after
removing individuals participating in the first information session; the second panel also
contains such individuals. Depending on the capacity constraint, the proposed method
leads to an improvement with respect to a random allocation between fourteen and five
percentage points; between nine and thirty-eight percentage points with respect to the
EWM; and between sixteen and two percentage points with respect to the degree central-
ity, with the exception of one single case. In one case only, for capacity constraints being
0.3, in the second panel, the NEWM underperforms with respect to the degree centrality
by 0.8 percentage points. Underperformance in specific circumstances may occur since the
NEWM does not directly use network information of the target units, differently from the
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degree centrality method, which instead uses information on the number of neighbors of
each individual. We also observe that the EWM underperforms with respect to the random
allocation strategy: ignoring network effects can lead to non-negligible bias on estimates
of treatment effects, which ultimately affects negatively the performance.18
In Table 2, we report the coefficients of the estimated policy function. We observe a
strong dependence of the optimal treatment rule with the risk aversion of each individual,
as well as the rice area of the individual, whereas we observe a negative dependence with
age. In Figure 3, we plot the estimated treatment allocation on the target sample for the
NEWM method with 20% capacity constraints. The black dots are the treated units, and
the white dots are the control units. Whereas the policy function does not contain network
information, we observe that the most central individuals in the network are treated by
the proposed method. In fact, the method exploits dependence between the observable
covariates, such as the rice area, risk aversion, and age with network characteristics from the
training sample to optimally target individuals when network information is not accessible
on the target sample. We also observe that treated units are distributed uniformly also
over the periphery of the network to guarantee spillovers also to individuals that are not
directly connected to the most central units.
Table 1: Log-difference in welfare of the NEWM with respect to the random allocation (first
column), EWM method (second column), degree centrality method (third column). First
panel collects results for targeting individuals, after removing those participating in the first
information session; the second panel include also such individuals for the targeting exer-
cise. Each row corresponds to capacity constraints being respectively 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%.
NEWM/Random All NEWM/EWM NEWM/Degree Cent
Capacity 0.2 0.143 0.090 0.165
Capacity 0.3 0.106 0.195 0.060
Capacity 0.4 0.053 0.302 0.026
Capacity 0.5 0.089 0.384 0.045
Capacity 0.2 0.136 0.141 0.187
Capacity 0.3 0.014 0.048 -0.008
Capacity 0.4 0.107 0.295 0.052
Capacity 0.5 0.112 0.376 0.072
18One last observation is worth mentioning: targeting individuals with the largest degree slightly under-
performs with respect to the random allocation for capacity constraints being 20% in the first panel. This
behavior may be due, for instance, to the negative correlation between degree centrality and covariates over
which treatment effects are positive.
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Table 2: Estimated coefficients for the proposed method, with respect to different levels of
capacity constraints. Coefficients are divided by the size of the coefficient for risk adversion.
Intercept Age Rice Area Risk Adversion
Capacity 0.2 -1.926 -0.284 0.878 1
Capacity 0.3 -0.817 -0.256 0.965 1
Capacity 0.4 -0.271 -0.181 0.854 1
Capacity 0.5 -0.203 -0.004 0.032 1
Figure 3: Treatment allocation on the target sample of the EWM method. Black dots
denote the treated units and white dots the control units.
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10 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a novel method for estimating treatment allocation rules
under network interference. Motivated by applications in the social sciences, we consider
arbitrary constrained environments, and we accommodate for policy functions that do
not necessarily depend on network information. The proposed methodology is valid for
a generic class of network formation models, and it relies on semi-parametric estimators.
We provide a mixed-integer linear programming formulation to the optimization problem,
and we discuss strong theoretical guarantees on the regret of the policy under network
interference.
We outlined the importance of considering the general case of random network forma-
tion whenever researchers only observe local information of the network. Random network
formation requires to carefully re-define identification and distributional assumptions. We
make two key assumptions: interactions are anonymous, and interference propagates at
most to one or two-degree neighbors. We leave to future research addressing the question
of optimal treatment allocation under general interactions and interference propagating on
the entire network.
Whereas the proposed methodology works for any given finite number of variables,
collecting information is often costly, and policy functions that depend on a small set of
variables might be preferable in many instances. Such concern rises new questions on
penalized welfare maximization methods (Mbakop and Tabord-Meehan, 2016) valid under
network interference.
Our results shed some light on the effect of the network topology on the performance of
NEWM. Our method is particularly suited when the maximum degree is controlled. Future
research should further explore the effect of the network topology on the performance as
well as the trade-off between EWM and Network EWM in the limiting case where most of
the units are completely disconnected.
Finally, the literature on influence maximization has often stressed the importance of
structural models, whereas literature on statistical treatment choice has mostly focused on
robust and often non-parametric estimation procedures. This paper opens new questions on
the trade-off between structural assumptions and model-robust inference when estimating
policy functions and exploring such trade-off remains an open research question.
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Appendix A A Simulation Study
In this section, we study the numerical performance of the proposed methodology in a
small simulation study. We collect results from a numerical experiment obtained from a
simulated network. We simulate data according to the following data generating process
(DGP):
Yi = |Ni|−1
(
Xiβ1 +Xiβ2Di + µ
) ∑
k∈Ni
Dk +Xiβ3Di + εi
εi = ηi/
√
2 +
∑
k∈Ni
ηk/
√
2|Ni|, ηi ∼i.i.d. N (0, 1),
(46)
where |Ni| is set to be one for the elements with no neighbors. The design allows for local
dependence of the outcomes, heterogeneous treatment, and spillover effects. We simulate
covariates as Xi,u ∼i.i.d. U(−1, 1) for u ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
We draw β1, β2, µ ∈ {−1, 1}3 independently and with equal probabilities. We draw
β3 ∈ {−1.5, 1.5} with equal probabilities. We evaluate the NEWM method with and
without propensity score adjustment, under correct specification of the conditional mean
function. We impose trimming at 1% on the estimation of the propensity score. We
compare the performance of the proposed methodology to two competing methods. First,
we consider the empirical welfare maximization method that does not account for network
interference discussed in Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) with a known propensity score of
individual treatment. Second, we compare also to the double robust formulation of the
EWM method discussed in Athey and Wager (2017), with a linear model specification
where no network effects are included in the regression. For any of the method under
consideration, we consider a policy function of the form
pi(Xi) = 1{Xi,1φ1 +Xi,2φ2 + φ3 ≥ 0}. (47)
Optimization is performed using the MILP formulation using the Gurobi software.
In a first set of simulations, we consider a geometric network formation of the form
Ai,j = 1{|Xi,2 −Xj,2|/2 + |Xi,4 −Xj,4|/2 ≤ rn} (48)
where rn =
√
4/2.75n similarly to simulations in Leung (2019). In a second set of simula-
tions we generate Barabasi-Albert networks also discussed in simulations in He and Song
(2018). Here, we first draw uniformly n/5 edges according to Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with
probabilities p = 10/n and second we draw sequentially connections of the new nodes to
the existing ones with probability equal to the number of connection of each pre-existing
node divided by the overall number of connections in the graph. We evaluate the methods
over 200 data sets, and we evaluate their performance over a new set of simulated data,
drawn from the same DGP.
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Figure 4: Out-of-sample median welfare over 200 replications. On the x-axis we report the
sample size and on the y-axis the welfare. Each sample size corresponds to a different data-
generating process for the network structure. The blue line denotes the proposed method
using only the outcome model. The purple line denotes the proposed method using the
double-robust estimator with trimming at 1%. The red line and the green line are the
EWM method respectively with double robust estimation and with only IPW estimation
of the welfare.
Results are collected in Figure 4. The figure reports the median welfare over the 200
draws. We observe an up-trending behavior of the NEWM with respect to the sample
size, and significant outperformance of the EWM method. Changes in the sample size also
leads to a change in the DGP and an increase in the overall number of connections in the
sample. This has a significant effect on the poor performance of the EWM method, which
does not account for network effects for estimation and optimization. Results showcase the
advantages of the NEWM in the presence of network interference.
Appendix B Proofs: Notation and Definitions
Before discussing the main results, we need to introduce the necessary notation. We let
Si(pi) =
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk) as discussed in Section 4.
In the first definition, we adapt definitions of covers for graphs (Janson, 2004) to the
context under study. We denote An the space of symmetric matrices in Rn×n with entries
being either zero or ones. We denote focal units the units indexed i ∈ {1, ..., n} used for
constructing the in-sample welfare function.
Definition B.1. (Proper Cover) Given an adjacency matrix An ∈ An, with n rows and
columns, a family Cn = {Cn(j)} of disjoint subsets of [n] is a proper cover of An if ∪Cn(j) =
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[n] and Cn(j) contains units such that for any pair of elements {(i, k) ∈ Cn(j), k 6= i},
A
(i,k)
n = 0.
The size of the smallest proper cover is the chromatic number, defined as χ(An).
Definition B.2. (Chromatic Number) The chromatic number χ(An), denotes the size of
the smallest proper cover of An.
Definition B.3. For a given matrix A ∈ A, we define A2n(A) ∈ An the adjacency matrix
where each row corresponds to a unit i ∈ {1, ..., n} and where two of such units are connected
if they are neighbor or they share one first or second degree neighbor. Similarly AMn (A) is
the adjacency matrix obtained after connecting such units sharing common neighbors up to
Mth degree.
Given A, the matrix A2n(A) is a deterministic function of the population adjacency ma-
trix A. Under random network formation, such matrices are random, and their distribution
depends on the distribution of A. For notational convenience, throughout our discussion,
we will suppress the dependence on A whenever clear from the context. The proper cover
of A2n is defined as C2n = {C2n(j)} with chromatic number χ(A2n). Similarly CMn = {CMn (j)}
with chromatic number χ(AMn ) corresponds to the M-degree case.
Next, we discuss definitions on covering numbers 19. For zn1 = (z1, ..., zn) be arbitrary
points in Z, for a function class F , with f ∈ F , f : Z 7→ R, we define,
F(zn1 ) = {f(z1), ..., f(zn) : f ∈ F}. (49)
Definition B.4. For a class of function F , with f : Z 7→ R, ∀f ∈ F and n data points
z1, ..., zn ∈ Z define the lq-covering number
Nq
(
ε,F(zn1 )
)
to be the cardinality of the smallest cover S := {s1, ..., sN}, with sj ∈ Rn, such that for
each f ∈ F , there exist an sj ∈ S such that ( 1n
∑n
i=1 |f(zi)− s(i)j |q)1/q < ε.
Throughout our analysis, for a random variable X = (X1, ..., Xn) we denote EX [.] the
expectation with respect to X. The Rademacher complexity is defined as follows.
Definition B.5. Let X1, ..., Xn be arbitrary random variables. Let σ = {σi}ni=1 be i.i.d
Rademacher random variables (i.e., P (σi = −1) = P (σi = 1) = 1/2), independent of
X1, ..., Xn. We define the empirical Rademacher complexity as
Rn(F) = Eσ
[
supf∈F |
1
n
n∑
i=1
σif(Xi)|
∣∣∣X1, ..., Xn]. (50)
19Here we adopt similar notation to Chapter 28 and Chapter 29 of Devroye et al. (2013).
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Appendix C Preliminary Lemmas
In this section we collect a first set of lemmas from past literature that we invoke in our
proofs.
Lemma C.1. (Brook’s Theorem,Brooks (1941)) For any connected undirected graph G
with maximum degree ∆, the chromatic number of G is at most ∆ unless G is a complete
graph or an odd cycle, in which case the chromatic number is ∆ + 1.
The next lemma discuss the case of estimated conditional mean and propensity score
function. The lemma follows from Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018).
Lemma C.2. (From Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018)) The following holds.
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmˆc,eˆc) ≤ 2 sup
pi∈Π
|W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)−W (pi)|+2 sup
pi∈Π
|Wˆ aipwn (pi, mˆc, eˆc)−Wn(pi,mc, ec)|.
Lemma C.3. (Lemma A.1, Kitagawa and Tetenov (2017)) Let t0 > 1, define
g(t) :=
{
0, for t = 0
t−1/2, t ≥ 1 , h(t) = t
−1/2
0 −
1
2
t
−3/2
0 (t− t0) + t−20 (t− t0).
Then g(t) ≤ h(t), for t = 0 and all t ≥ 1.
Lemma C.4. (Van Der Vaart and Wellner (1996)) Let σ1, ..., σn be Rademacher sequence
independent of X1, ..., Xn. Then
E
[
supf∈F
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
f(Xi)− E[f(Xi)]
∣∣∣] ≤ 2E[supf∈F ∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
σif(Xi)
∣∣∣].
In the next two lemmas we formalize two key properties of covering numbers.
Lemma C.5. (Theorem 29.6, Devroye et al. (2013)) Let F1, ...,Fk be classes of real func-
tions on Rd. For n arbitrary points zn1 = (z1, ..., zn) in Rd, define the sets F1(zn1 ), ...,Fk(zn1 )
in Rn by
Fj(zn1 ) = {fj(z1), ..., fj(zn) : fj ∈ Fj}, j = 1, ..., k.
Also introduce
F = {f1 + ...+ fk; fj ∈ Fj , j = 1, ..., k}.
Then for every ε > 0 and zn1 ,
N1
(
ε,F(zn1 )
)
≤
k∏
j=1
N1
(
ε/k,Fj(zn1 )
)
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Lemma C.6. (Pollard, 1990) Let F and G be classes of real valued functions on Rd bounded
by M1 and M2 respectively. For arbitrary fixed points z
n
1 in Rd, let
J (zn1 ) = {(h(z1), ..., h(zn);h ∈ J }, J = {fg; f ∈ F , g ∈ G}.
Then for every ε > 0 and zn1 ,
N1
(
ε,J (zn1 )
)
≤ N1
( ε
2M2
,F(zn1 )
)
N1
( ε
2M1
,G(zn1 )
)
.
Lemma C.7. (Wenocur and Dudley, 1981) Let g : Rd 7→ R be an arbitrary function and
consider the class of functions G = {g + f, f ∈ F}. Then
V C(G) = V C(F)
where V C(F), V C(G) denotes the VC dimension respectively of F and G.
An important relation between covering numbers and Rademacher complexity is given
by the Dudley’s entropy integral bound.
Lemma C.8. (From Theorem 5.22 in Wainwright (2019)) For a function class F of
uniformly bounded functions and arbitrary fixed points zn1 ∈ Rd, and Rademacher random
variables σ1, ..., σn in R,
Eσ
[
supf∈F
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σif(zi)
∣∣∣] ≤ 32√
n
∫ Dq
0
√
log
(
Nq
(
u,F(zn1 )
))
du,
where Dq denotes the maximum diameter of F(zn1 ) according to the metric
dq(f, g) =
(
1
n
∑n
i=1(f(zi)− g(zi))q
)1/q
.
Theorem 5.22 in Wainwright (2019) provides a general version of Lemma C.8. Equiva-
lent versions of Lemma C.8 can be found also in Van Der Vaart and Wellner (1996).
Remark 10. (Measurability requirements) As also argued in Athey and Wager (2017),
whenever F = Π, where Π defines the function class of binary treatment assignment rules,
the (conditional) Rademacher complexity defined in Equation (50) is measurable for any
finite n, since the supremum is taken over countably many elements. On the other hand
suprema of more general processes which are considered throughout our proof may not be
necessarily measurable. Therefore, throughout our discussion, we refer to the supremum
function as the lattice supremum, as defined in Haj lasz and Maly` (2002), which is guaran-
teed to be measurable as discussed below.
Lemma C.9. (Lemma 2.6, Haj lasz and Maly` (2002)) Let U be a class of measurable
functions defined on a measurable space E ⊂ Rn. Then the lattice supremum defined as∨U exists and there is a countable sub-family V ⊂ U such that∨
U =
∨
V = supV. (51)
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The above lemma has one important implication: by taking the lattice supremum over
a function class, we are guaranteed that such supremum corresponds to a supremum over
a countable subset, for which the pointwise supremum is defined. By construction, such
class V has VC-dimension bounded by the VC-dimension of the original function class U .
Throughout the rest of our discussion the supremum is defined as the lattice supremum.
Appendix D Lemmas and Propositions
D.1 Indetification
Lemma D.1. Let Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 hold. Then
E
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
e
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) Yi] = E[m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)].
Proof. Under Assumption 3.1, we can write
E
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
e
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) Yi]
= E
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
e
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) r(pi(Xi), Si(pi), |Ni|, Zi, εi)]. (52)
Using the law of iterated expectations, the previous equation is equal to
E
[
E
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
e
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) r(pi(Xi), Si(pi), |Ni|, Zi, εi)∣∣∣Ni, Zk∈Ni , Zi]].
(53)
Under Assumption 3.4, which states independence of εi with Ni and Zk∈Ni and uncon-
foundeness of treatment assignments, we can then write
(53) = E
[
E
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
e
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) |Ni, Zk∈Ni , Zi]
× E
[
r
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), |Ni|, Zi, εi
)∣∣∣Ni, Zk∈Ni , Zi]].
By definition
E
[1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, pi(Xi) = Di}
e
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) |Ni, Zk∈Ni , Zi] = 1.
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Finally, by Assumption 3.4
E
[
r
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), |Ni|, Zi, εi
)∣∣∣Ni, Zk∈Ni , Zi] = m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), |Ni|, Zi,).
Lemma D.2. Let Si(pi) be defined as in Section 4. Let Assumption 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 hold.
Then
E
[ 1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)(Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))+mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)]
= E
[
m
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)]
,
if either ec = e or (and) mc = m.
Proof. Whenever ec = e, from Proposition D.1, we obtain that
E
[ 1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)Yi] = E[m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)].
Since
E
[ 1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Xk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
) ] = 1
as discussed in the proof of Proposition D.1, the result follows. Let now mc = m. let
Ai = Zk∈Ni , Nk∈Ni , Ni, Zi. Then under Assumption 3.4
E
[ 1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)(Yi −m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))∣∣∣Aii]
= E
[ 1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)(r(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|, εi)−m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))∣∣∣Ai]
= E
[ 1{Si(pi) = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)∣∣∣Zk∈Ni , Nk∈Ni , Ni, Zi]
× E
[(
r
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|, εi
)
−m
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
))∣∣∣Ai] = 0
since the second term is equal to zero.
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D.2 Other Lemmas and Propositions
Lemma D.3. The following holds: χ(An) ≤ χ(A2n) ≤ 3N 3n,3. More generally, χ(An) ≤
χ(AMn ) ≤MNM+1n,M+1.
Proof. It follows by Lemma C.1 that χ(A2n) is bounded by the maximum degree of A
2
n.
Since each unit can at most be connected to Nn,1 − 1 many neighbors and N 2n,2 many
second degree neighbors, and N 3n,3 many third degree neighbors, the first result follows.
Similarly, for the second statement.
Due to composition of functions we cannot apply directly Lemma C.8. Instead, we
need a more refined analysis that bounds first the covering number and the Rademacher
complexity of the function class of interest. We break our proof into several lemmas.
Lemma D.4. Let F1, ...,Fk be class of bounded functions with VC-dimension v <∞ and
envelope F¯ <∞, for k ≥ 2. Let
J = {f1(f2 + ...+ fk), fj ∈ Fj , j = 1, ..., k}
and let
Jn(zn1 ) = {h(z1), ..., h(zn);h ∈ J }.
For arbitrary fixed points zn1 ∈ Rd∫ 2F¯
0
√
log
(
N1
(
u,J (zn1 )
))
du < cF¯
√
k log(k)v.
for a constant cF¯ <∞ that only depend on F¯ .
Proof. Let
F−1(zn1 ) = {f2(zn1 ) + ...+ fk(zn1 ), fj ∈ Fj , j = 2, ..., k}
and let Fj(zn1 ) as in Lemma C.5. By Lemma C.5,
N1
(
ε,F−1(zn1 )
)
≤
k∏
j=2
N1
(
ε/(k − 1),Fj(zn1 )
)
.
By Lemma C.6,
N1
(
ε,Jn(zn1 )
)
≤
k∏
j=2
N1
( ε
2F¯ (k − 1) ,Fj(z
n
1 )
)
N1
( ε
2F¯
,F1(zn1 )
)
.
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By standard properties of covering numbers, for a generic set H, N1(ε,H) ≤ N2(ε,H).
Therefore
N1
(
ε,Jn(zn1 )
)
≤
k∏
j=2
N1
( ε
2F¯ (k − 1) ,Fj(z
n
1 )
)
N1
( ε
2F¯
,F1(zn1 )
)
≤
k∏
j=2
N2
( ε
2F¯ (k − 1) ,Fj(z
n
1 )
)
N2
( ε
2F¯
,F1(zn1 )
)
.
We apply now a uniform entropy bound for the covering number. By Theorem 2.6.7 of
Van Der Vaart and Wellner (1996), we have that for a universal constant C,
N2
( ε
2F¯ (k − 1) ,Fj(z
n
1 )
)
≤ C(v + 1)(16e)(v+1)
(2F¯ (k − 1)
ε
)2v
which implies that
log
(
N1
(
ε,Jn(zn1 )
))
≤
k−1∑
j=1
log
(
N2
( ε
2F¯ (k − 1) ,Fj(z
n
1 )
))
+ log
(
N2
( ε
2F¯
,F1(zn1 )
))
≤ k log
(
C(v + 1)(16e)v+1
)
+ k2v log(2CF¯ (k − 1)/ε).
Since
∫ 2F¯
0
√
k log
(
C(v + 1)(16e)v+1
)
+ k2v log(2CF¯ (k − 1)/ε)dε ≤ cF¯
√
k log(k)v for a
constant cF¯ <∞. 20, the result follows.
The next lemma provides a bound on the Rademacher complexity in the presence of
composition of functions. We extend the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction inequality(Ledoux
and Talagrand, 2011; Chernozhukov et al., 2014) to the case of interest in this paper.
Lemma D.5. Let φi : R 7→ R be Lipschitz functions with parameter L, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n},
i.e., |φi(a)− φi(b)| ≤ L|a− b| for all a, b ∈ R, with φi(0) = 0. Then, for any T ⊆ Rn, with
t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ R, α = (α1, ..., αn) ∈ A ⊆ {0, 1}n,
1
2
Eσ
[
supt∈T ,α∈A
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
∣∣∣] ≤ LEσ[supt∈T ,α∈A∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
αiσiti
∣∣∣]
Proof. The proof follows similarly as in the one for the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction
inequality (Theorem 4.12 in Ledoux and Talagrand (2011)), with appropriate changes to
deal with the additional α vector. First note that if T is unbounded, there will be some
20The reader might refer to Equation (5.50) in Wainwright (2019) and Equation (A.6) in Kitagawa and
Tetenov (2018) .
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setting so that the right hand side is infinity and the result trivially holds. Therefore, we
can focus to the case where T is bounded. First we aim to show that for T ⊆ R2, for
α ∈ {0, 1}2,
E
[
supt∈T ,α∈Aα1t1 + σ2φ(t2)α2
]
≤ E
[
supt∈T ,α∈Aα1t1 + Lσ2t2α2
]
. (54)
If the claim above is true, than it follows that
E
[
supt∈T ,α∈Aα1φ1(t1)σ1 + σ2φ(t2)α2|σ1
]
≤ E
[
supt∈T ,α∈Aα1φ1(t1)σ1 + Lσ2t2α2
∣∣∣σ1].
as σ1φ(t1) simply transforms T (and it is still bounded, if not the claim would trivially
holds), and we can iteretavely apply this result. Hence, we first prove Equation (54). Define
for a, b ∈ A,
I(t, s, a, b) :=
1
2
(
t1a1 + a2φ(t2)
)
+
1
2
(
s1b1 − b2φ(s2)
)
.
We want to show that the right hand side in Equation (54) is larger thant I(t, s, a, b) for
all t, s ∈ T and a, b ∈ A. Since we are taking the supremum over t, s, a, b, we can assume
without loss of generality that
t1a1 + a2φ(t2) ≥ s1b1 + b2φ(s2), s1b1 − b2φ(s2) ≥ t1a1 − a2φ(t2). (55)
We can now define four quantities of interest, being
m = b1s1 − b2φ(s2), n = b1s1 − Ls2b2, m′ = a1t1 + La2t2, n′ = a1t1 + a2φ(t2).
We would like to show that 2I(t, s, a, b) = m + n′ ≤ m′ + n. We consider four different
cases, similarly to the proof of Ledoux and Talagrand (2011) and argue that for any value
of (a1, a2, b1, b2) ∈ {0, 1}4 the claim holds.
Case 1 Start from the case a2t2, s2b2 ≥ 0. We know that φ(0) = 0, so that |b2φ(s2)| ≤
Lb2s2. Now assume that a2t2 ≥ b2s2. In this case
m− n = Lb2s2 − b2φ(s2) ≤ La2t2 − a2φ(t2) = m′ − n′ (56)
since |a2φ(t2) − b2φ(s2)| ≤ L|a2t2 − b2s2| = L(a2t2 − b2s2). To see why this last claim
holds, notice that for a2, b2 = 1, then the results hold by the condition a2t2 ≥ b2s2 and
Lipschitz continuity. If instead a2 = 1, b2 = 0, the claim trivially holds. While the case
a2 = 0, b2 = 1, then it must be that s2 = 0 since we assumed that a2t2 ≥ 0, b2s2 ≥ 0 and
a2t2 ≥ b2s2. Thus m− n ≤ m′ − n′. If instead b2s2 ≥ a2t2, then use −φ instead of φ and
switch the roles of s, t giving a similar proof.
Case 2 Let a2t2 ≤ 0, b2s2 ≤ 0. Then the proof is the same as Case 1, switching the signs
where necessary.
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Case 3 Let a2t2 ≥ 0, b2s2 ≤ 0. Then we have a2φ(t2) ≤ La2t2, since a2 ∈ {0, 1} and by
Lipschitz properties of φ and similarly −b2φ(s2) ≤ −b2Ls2 so that
a2φ(t2)− b2φ(s2) ≤ b2Lt2 − a2Ls2
proving the claim.
Case 4 Let a2t2 ≤ 0, b2s2 ≥ 0. Then similarly as above we have −b2φ(s2) ≤ b2Ls2 and
a2φ(t2) ≤ −a2Lt2, so that the claim holds symmetrically as the previous case.
We now conclude the proof. Denote [x]+ = max{0, x} and [x]− = max{−x, 0}. Then we
have
E
[1
2
supt∈T ,α∈A
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
∣∣∣]
≤ E
[1
2
supt∈T ,α∈A
( n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
)
+
]
+ E
[1
2
supt∈T ,α∈A
( n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
)
−
]
≤ E
[
supt∈T ,α∈A
( n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
)
+
]
where the last inequality follows by symmetry of σi and the fact that (−x)− = (x)+. Notice
that supx(x)+ = (supxx)+. Therefore, using Equation (54)
E
[
supt∈T ,α∈A
( n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
)
+
]
= E
[(
supt∈T ,α∈A
n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
)
+
]
≤ E
[(
supt∈T ,α∈A
n∑
i=1
Lσitiαi
)
+
]
≤ E
[∣∣∣supt∈T ,α∈A n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
∣∣∣] ≤ E[supt∈T ,α∈A∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
σiφi(ti)αi
∣∣∣]
which completes the proof.
To apply Lemma D.5, we need to prove Lipschitz continuity of the function of interest.
We do so in the next lemma.
Lemma D.6. ec(.) ∈ (δ, 1− δ) for δ ∈ (0, 1). Then
1{N = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
d,N,Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)
is 2/δ-Lipschitz in its second argument for all d ∈ {0, 1}
Proof. Let Oi = Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|. Then for any N,N ′ ∈ Z∣∣∣1{N = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
d,N,Oi
) − 1{N ′ = ∑k∈Ni Dk, d = Di}
ec
(
d,N ′, Oi
) ∣∣∣ ≤ 2
δ
.
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for N 6= N ′. The last inequality follows from the fact that by the overlap condition and
the triangular inequality. Sine N is discrete, the right hand side is at least 2/δ|N − N ′|
which completes the proof.
Lemma D.7. Let X1, ..., Xn be independent Bernoulli random variables with bi ∼ Bern(pi).
Let p¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 pi with np¯ > 1 and g(.) as defined in the Lemma C.3. Then
E
[
g
( n∑
i=1
Xi
)]
< 2(np¯)−1/2
Proof. The proof follows similarly as in Kitagawa and Tetenov (2017). Let h(.) be the
function defined in Lemma C.3 with t0 = np¯. By Lemma C.3,
E
[
g
( n∑
i=1
Xi
)]
≤ E
[
h
( n∑
i=1
Xi
)]
= E
[
(np¯)−1/2 − 1
2
√
(np¯)3
( n∑
i=1
Xi −
n∑
i=1
E[Xi]
)
+ (np¯)−2
( n∑
i=1
Xi −
n∑
i=1
E[Xi]
)2]
= (np¯)−1/2 − 1
2
(np¯)−3/20 + (np¯)−2V ar
( n∑
i=1
Xi
)
= (np¯)−1/2 + (np¯)−2
n∑
i=1
pi(1− pi)
≤ (np¯)−1/2 + (np¯)−2
n∑
i=1
pi
= (np¯)−1/2 + (np¯)−2np¯
= (np¯)−1/2 + (np¯)−1 < 2(np¯)−1/2
since np¯ > 1 and (np¯)−1 < (np¯)−1/2.
We aim to provide upper bounds on the Rademacher complexity for function classes
with bounded Dudley’s entropy integral, and with observations that (for the moment)
we let to be independent but not identically distributed. In the next lemma we extend
Lemma A.5 in Kitagawa and Tetenov (2017) to the case of class of functions with bounded
Dudley’s entropy integral for independent but not necessarly identically distributed random
variables.
Lemma D.8. Let F a class of uniformly bounded functions, i.e., there exist F¯ <∞, such
that ||f ||∞ ≤ F¯ for all f ∈ F . Let (Yi, Zi) ∼ Pi, where Y ≥ 0 is a scalar (Y,Z may
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be dependent). Let {(Yi, Zi)}ni=1 be pairwise independent(but not necessarily identically
distributed). Assume that for some u > 0,
E[Y 2+ui ] < B, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
In addition assume that for any fixed points zn1 , for some V <∞,∫ D
0
√
log
(
N1
(
u,F(zn1 )
))
du <
√
V ,
where D denotes the maximum diameter of F(zn1 ) according to the metric
d(f, g) = 1n
∑n
i=1
∣∣∣f(zi)− g(zi)∣∣∣. Let σi be i.i.d Rademacher random variables independent
of Y,Z. Then there exist a constant 0 < CF¯ <∞ that only depend on F¯ and u, such that∫ ∞
0
E
[
supf∈F
∣∣∣ 1
n
σi
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)1{Yi > y}
∣∣∣]dy ≤ CF¯√BVn
for all n ≥ 1.
Proof. First, define
ξn(y) = supf∈F
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)1{Yi > y}σi
∣∣∣.
Denote p¯(y) = 1n
∑n
i=1 P (Yi > y).
Consider first values of y for which np¯(y) =
∑n
i=1 P (Yi > y) ≤ 1. Due to the envelope
condition, and the definition of Rademacher random variables, we have∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)1{Yi > y}σi
∣∣∣ ≤ F¯ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Yi > y}, ∀f ∈ F .
Taking expectations we have
E[ξn(y)] ≤ F¯E
[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Yi > y}
]
= F¯ p¯(y)
and the right hand side is bounded by F¯ 1n for this particular case.
Consider now values of y such that np¯(y) > 1. Define the random variableNy =
∑n
i=1 1{Yi >
y}. Then we can write
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(Xi)1{Yi > y}σi =
{
0 if Ny = 0
Ny
n
1
Ny
∑n
i=1 f(Zi)1{Yi > y}σi if Ny ≥ 1.
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If Ny ≥ 1, then
ξn(y) = supf∈F
∣∣∣Ny
n
1
Ny
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)σi1{Yi > y}
∣∣∣
= supf∈F
∣∣∣Ny
n
1
Ny
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)σi1{Yi > y} − p¯(y) 1
Ny
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)1{Yi > y}σi+
+ p¯(y)
1
Ny
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)1{Yi > y}σi
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Ny
n
− p¯(y)
∣∣∣supf∈F ∣∣∣ 1Ny
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)1{Yi > y}σi
∣∣∣+ p¯(y)supf∈F ∣∣∣ 1Ny ∑i=1 f(Zi)σi1{Yi > y}
∣∣∣.
Denote Eσ the expectation only with respect to the Rademacher random variables σ.
Conditional on Ny, ξn(y) sums over Ny terms. Therefore, for a constant 0 < C1 <∞ that
only depend on F¯ ,
Eσ
[
p¯(y)supf∈F |
1
Ny
∑
i=1
f(Zi)σi1{Yi > y}
∣∣∣] ≤ C1p¯(y)√V g(Ny)
by Lemma C.8, where g(.) is defined in Lemma C.3. Similarly,
Eσ
[∣∣∣Ny
n
− p¯(y)
∣∣∣supf∈F ∣∣∣ 1Ny
n∑
i=1
f(Zi)1{Yi > y}σi
∣∣∣] ≤ ∣∣∣Ny
n
− p¯(y)
∣∣∣C1√V g(Ny).
For Ny ≥ 1, it follows by the law of iterated expectations,
E[ξn(y)|Ny] ≤ |Ny
n
−p¯(y)|C1
√
V g(Ny)+C1p¯(y)
√
V g(Ny) ≤ |Ny
n
−p¯(y)|C1
√
V+C1p¯(y)
√
V g(Ny)
(57)
where the last inequality follows by the definition of the g(.) function and the fact that
Ny ∈ {0, 1, ..., }. For Ny = 0 instead, we have
E[ξn(y)|Ny] ≤
∣∣∣Ny
n
− p¯(y)
∣∣∣C1√V g(Ny) + C1p¯(y)√V g(Ny) = 0
by the definition of g(.). Hence, the bound in Equation (57) always holds. We are left to
bound the unconditional expectation with respect to Ny. Notice first that
E
[∣∣∣Ny
n
− p¯(y)
∣∣∣] ≤ C1√V√E[∣∣∣Ny
n
− p¯(y)
∣∣∣2] = C1√V
√√√√V ar( 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Yi > y}
)
.
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By independence assumption,
C1
√
V
√√√√V ar( 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Yi > y}
)
= C1
√
V
√√√√ 1
n2
n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y)(1− P (Yi > y))
≤ C1
√
V
√√√√ 1
n2
n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y).
In addition, since np¯(y) > 1, by Lemma D.8, E[g(Ny)] ≤ 2√
n
√
p¯(y)
. Combining the inequal-
ities, it follows
E[ξn(y)] ≤ C1
√
V
√√√√ 1
n2
n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y) + p¯(y)C1
√
V
2√
n
√
p¯(y)
≤ 2(1 + C1)
√
V
n
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y).
This bound is larger than the bound derived for np¯(y) < 1, up to a constant factor that
depend on F¯ , namely up to CF¯ <∞. Therefore,
E[ξn(y)] ≤ CF¯
√
V
n
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y).
We can now write∫ ∞
0
E[ξn(y)]dy ≤
∫ ∞
0
CF¯
√
V
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y)
n
dy =
∫ 1
0
CF¯
√
V
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y)
n
dy
+
∫ ∞
1
CF¯
√
V
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y)
n
dy.
The first term is bounded as follows.∫ 1
0
CF¯
√
V
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y)
n
dy ≤ CF¯
√
V
n
.
The second term is bounded instead as follows.∫ ∞
1
CF¯
√
V
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
P (Yi > y)
n
dy ≤ CF¯
√
V
n
∫ ∞
1
√√√√ n∑
i=1
E[Y 2+ui ]
ny2+u
dy ≤ CF¯
√
V
n
∫ ∞
1
√
B
y2+u
dy
≤ C ′¯F
√
V B
n
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for a constant C ′¯
F
<∞ that only depend on F¯ and u.
In the following lemma we combine previous results and we provide upper bounds on the
Rademacher complexity of composition of functions with observations being independent
but not identically distributed, under weak moment conditions.
Lemma D.9. Let Π be a function class with pi : Rd 7→ {0, 1} for any pi ∈ Π, with finite VC-
dimension, denoted as V C(Π). Let {Zi}ni=1 = {(Vi, X1i , X2i , ..., Xhi , Oi, Yi)}ni=1 be pairwise
independent random variables, with E[Y 2+ui ] < B1 < ∞ for all i ∈ {1, ...n} for some
u > 0. Let X1, ..., Xh, V ∈ Rd, O ∈ Rk. Let σ1, ..., σn be independent Rademacher random
variables, independent on {Zi}ni=1. Let f : Z×Rk 7→ R be L-Lipschitz in its first argument.
Assume that E[f(0, Oi)2+uY 2+ui ] < B2 < ∞ for all i ∈ {1, ...n} for some u > 0. Let
1 ≤ h <∞. Then for a constant C <∞ that only depend on u,
E[sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi
∣∣∣] ≤ C(L+1)√(h+ 1) log(h+ 1)VC(Π)(B1 +B2)
n
Proof. First, we add and subtract the value of the function f(0, Oi) at zero. Namely,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σi
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
)
+ f
(
0, Oi
))
Yipi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
≤ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σi
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
Yipi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σif
(
0, Oi
)
Yipi(Vi)
∣∣∣]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
(58)
where the last inequality follows by the triangular inequality.
We bound first term (1). First, we write the function of interest as follows
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σi
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
Yipi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
= E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σi
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
|Yi|sign(Yi)pi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
≤ 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
|Yi|pi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
(59)
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where σ˜i are Rademacher random variables independent on Z1, ..., Zn
21. Since |Yi| > 0,
we can write the above expression as
(59) = 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))∫ ∞
0
1{|Yi| > y}dypi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
≤ 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∫ ∞
0
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
1{|Yi| > y}pi(Vi)
∣∣∣dy]
≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
1{|Yi| > y}pi(Vi)
∣∣∣]dy
where the last inequality follows by the properties of the supremum function and Fubini
theorem. We decompose the supremum over pi ∈ Π as follows.∫ ∞
0
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
1{|Yi| > y}pi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
≤
∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi2(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣]
Let φi(N) = f
(
N,Oi
)
−f
(
0, Oi
)
. Conditional on the data, φi is not random. By assump-
tion it is Lipschitz and φi(0) = 0. By Lemma D.5 and Lemma D.6, and the law of iterated
expectations,∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi2(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣]
=
∫ ∞
0
E
[
Eσ˜
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
(
f
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi2(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
− f
(
0, Oi
))
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣]]
≤ L
∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi2(X
(k)
i )
)
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣].
(60)
We decompose the supremum as follows:
L
∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pi2(X
(k)
i )
)
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣]
≤ L
∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π,...,pih+1∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pik+1(X
(k)
i )
)
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣]
21To check the last claim the reader might consider that P (σ˜i = 1|Yi) = P (σisign(Yi) = 1|Yi) = 1/2.
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We re-parametrize the class of functions as follows.
L
∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π,...,pih+1∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pik+1(X
(k)
i )
)
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣]
= L
∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π,pi2∈Π2,...,pih+1∈Πh+1
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pik+1(Zi)
)
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Zi)
∣∣∣],
Where Π1, ...,Πh+1, are such that for a data point Zi for all pij ∈ Πj , pij(Zi) = pi(Z(j:(j+d))i )
picks the entries indexed by j : (j + d) 22. Namely each function pij ∈ Πj picks the entries
of the data point Zi that corresponds to the values at which the policy in evaluated in
Equation (60). By Lemma C.7, V C(Πj) = V C(Π) for all j ∈ {1, ..., h} 23. Let
Π˜ = {pi1
( h∑
j=1
pij+1
)
, pik ∈ Πk, k = 1, ..., h+ 1}.
For any fixed point data point zn1 , by Lemma D.4, the Dudley’s integral of the function
class Π˜(zn1 ) is bounded by C
√
(h+ 1) log(h+ 1)V C(Π), for a constant C. Therefore, by
Lemma D.8,∫ ∞
0
E
[
suppi1∈Π1,pi2∈Π2,...,pih+1∈Πh+1
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i
( ∑
k∈{1,...,h}
pik+1(X
(k)
i )
)
1{|Yi| > y}pi1(Vi)
∣∣∣]
≤ C
√
B1(h+ 1)
V C(Π) log(h+ 1)
n
for a constant C.
Next, we bound the term (2) in Equation (58). Following the same argument used for
term (1), we have
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜if
(
0, Oi
)
Yipi(Vi)
∣∣∣] ≤ 2E[ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i|f
(
0, Oi
)
Yi|pi(Vi)
∣∣∣]
≤
∫ ∞
0
2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i1{|f
(
0, Oi
)
Yi| > y}pi(Vi)
∣∣∣]dy
Since Π has finite VC-dimension, and it contains functions mapping to {0, 1}, by Theorem
2.6.7 of Van Der Vaart and Wellner (1996) 24,
∫ 2
0
√N2(u,Π(zn1 ))du < C√V C(Π) for a
22For instance, pi1(Z1) = pi(Vi).
23The reader might recognize that each pij ∈ Πj can be written as the sum of pi and functions constant
at zero.
24The argument is the same used in the proof of Lemma D.4.
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constant C. Hence, by Lemma D.8,∫ ∞
0
2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σ˜i1{|f
(
0, Oi
)
Yi| > y}pi(Vi)
∣∣∣]dy ≤ c′0
√
B2VC(Π)
n
for a constant c′0. Since we have bound both (2) and (1) in Equation (58), the proof is
complete.
In the next lemma we provide bounds on the Rademacher complexity of locally de-
pendent random variables. We let {Zi}ni=1 = {(Vi, Xj∈Ni , Oi, Yi)}ni=1 be arbitrary random
variables.
Lemma D.10. Let Π be a class of functions with pi : Rd 7→ {0, 1} for any pi ∈ Π. Assume
that it has finite VC-dimension, namely VC(Π) <∞. Let {Zi}ni=1 = {(Vi, Xj∈Ni , Oi, Yi)}ni=1
be n random variables of interest such that for any A ∈ A being the population adjacency
matrix, Zi ⊥ Zj |A if j 6∈ Ni,M+1. Assume that E[Y 2+ui |A] < B1 < ∞, for all i, for some
u > 0. Let Xi, Vi ∈ Rd, O ∈ Rp. Let σ1, ..., σn be independent Rademacher random vari-
ables, independent on {Zi}ni=1. Let f : {0, 1} × Z × Rp 7→ R be L-Lipschitz in its second
argument. Assume that E[f(d, 0, Oi)2+uY 2+ui |A] < B2 < ∞ for all i ∈ {1, ..n}, d ∈ {0, 1}
for some u > 0. Then for a constant C <∞ that only depends on u,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
f
(
pi(Vi), Si(pi), Oi
)
σiYi|
∣∣∣A] ≤MC(L+1)NM+1n,M+1Nn,1 log(Nn,1+1)
√
(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
where Si(pi) =
∑
k∈Ni pi(X
(k)
i ).
Proof. By the triangular inequality,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
f
(
pi(Vi), Si(pi), Oi
)
σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
f
(
1, Si(pi), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
f
(
0, Si(pi), Oi
)
(1− pi(Vi))σiYi|
∣∣∣A]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
.
We proceed by bounding the first term in the summation, while the second term follows
similarly. We denote CMn the proper cover of AMn , where AMn is defined in Definition B.3
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and CMn is defined in Definition B.1. Notice that CMn is measurable with respect to the
sigma-algebra generated by A. Conditional on A, we write
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
f
(
1, Si(pi), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
= E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
CMn (j)∈CMn
∑
i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1, Si(pi), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[ ∑
CMn (j)∈CMn
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1, Si(pi), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
∣∣∣A].
We focus on bounding (i) first. We decompose the term into sums of terms that have the
same number of neighbors. Namely,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1, Si(pi), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
= E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|
∑
l∈{0,...,Nn,1}
1
n
∑
i:|Ni|=l,i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1, Si(pi), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[ ∑
l∈{0,...,Nn,1}
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
i:|Ni|=l,i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1, Si(pi), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]∣∣∣A],
where the last inequality follows by the triangular inequality. Consider now the case of
units having at least one neighbor. Namely consider units i such that |Ni| ≥ 1. Then we
have by Lemma D.9 25,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
i:|Ni|=l,i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1,
∑
k∈Ni
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
≤ CL
√√√√∣∣∣i : |Ni| = l, i ∈ CMn (j)∣∣∣(l + 1) log(l + 1)(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n2
,
where
∣∣∣i : |Ni| = l, i ∈ CMn (j)∣∣∣ denote the number of elements in ∣∣∣i : |Ni| = l, i ∈ CMn (j)∣∣∣.
By Definition B.1, ∣∣∣i : |Ni| = l, i ∈ CMn (j)∣∣∣ ≤ n.
25The reader might recall that random variables within each sub-cover are pairwise independent.
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Therefore, for a constant C that only depends on u,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
i:|Ni|=l,i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1,
∑
k∈Ni
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
≤ C(L+ 1)
√
(l + 1) log(l + 1)(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
.
By concavity of the square-root function, we have
E
[ ∑
l∈{1,...,Nn}
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
i:|Ni|=l,i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1,
∑
k∈Ni
pi(X
(k)
i ), Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[ ∑
l∈{1,...,Nn,1}
C(L+ 1)
√
(l + 1) log(l + 1)(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[
C(L+ 1)
√∑
l∈{1,...,Nn,1}(l + 1) log(l + 1)(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[
C ′(L+ 1)
√
N 2n,1 log(Nn,1 + 1)(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
∣∣∣A]
for some constant C ′ that only depend on u. Consider now the case where |Ni| = 0. By
Lemma D.8,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
∑
i:|Ni|=0,i∈CMn (j)
f
(
1, 0, Oi
)
pi(Vi)σiYi|
∣∣∣A]
≤ C ′′E
[√
(B1 +B2)
|i : |Ni| = 0, i ∈ CMn (j)|VC(Π)
n2
∣∣∣A]
for some constant C ′′ that only depend on u. Here |i : |Ni| = 0, i ∈ CMn (j)| denotes the
number of elements in {i : |Ni| = 0, i ∈ CMn (j)}. Notice that
C ′′E
[√
(B1 +B2)
|i : |Ni| = 0, i ∈ CMn (j)|VC(Π)
n2
∣∣∣A] ≤ C ′′√(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
The above inequality follows since by construction |i : |Ni| = 0, i ∈ CMn (j)| ≤ n. Summing
over all possible sub-covers,
E
[ ∑
CMn (j)∈CMn
C(L+ 1)
√
N 2n,1 log(Nn + 1)(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
+
∑
CMn (j)∈C2n
C ′′
√
(B1 +B2)
VC(Π)
n
∣∣∣A]
≤ E
[
χ(AMn )Nn,1 log(Nn,1 + 1)c0(L+ 1)
√
(B1 +B2)VC(Π)
n
∣∣∣A]
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where the last inequality follows since Nn,1 is a positive integer, for a constant 0 < c0 <∞.
Here χ(AMn ) is defined in Definition B.2 and Definition B.3. The bound for (II) follows
similarly. By Lemma D.3, χ(AMn ) ≤MNM+1n,M+1. The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 8.1
Proof. First, by Lemma C.4 we can bound the expectation as
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)− E[pi(Xi)]
∣∣∣] ≤ 2E[ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σipi(Xi)
∣∣∣]. (61)
By finiteness of the VC dimension, and by the fact that the maximum diameter of Π is
two, we have as discussed in Chapter 5 in Wainwright (2019), that for a universal constant
C¯ ∫ 2
0
√
log(N2(u,Π))du ≤ C¯
√
V C(Π). (62)
Therefore by Lemma C.8
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σipi(Xi)
∣∣∣] ≤ C¯ ′√V C(Π)/n. (63)
for a universal constant C¯ ′. We are left to show concentration of the left-hand side in
Equation (40) around its expectation. Notice now that
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)−
∫
pi(x)dFx(x) (64)
satisfies the bounded difference inequality with constant 2/n. In addition, by Assumption
8.1, units Xi satisfy the definition of (HD,m) discussed in Definition 3 in Paulin (2012)
for finite m. In addition by Lemma 1.1 in Paulin (2012), the random variables are also
(HD,m,m). By Corollary 2.1 in Paulin (2012), we have that
P
(∣∣∣ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)−
∫
pi(x)dF (x)
∣∣∣− E[ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)−
∫
pi(x)dF (x)
∣∣∣]∣∣∣ > t)
≤ 2 exp
(
− nt
2
m22
)
.
(65)
by setting γ = 2 exp
(
− nt2
m22
)
and t = m
√
log(2/γ)/n, we obtain that with probability
1− γ ,
∣∣∣ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)−
∫
pi(x)dF (x)
∣∣∣−E[ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)−
∫
pi(x)dF (x)
∣∣∣]∣∣∣ ≤ m√log(2/γ)/n.
(66)
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Therefore, using the bound on the expectation derived above, we have
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(Xi)−
∫
pi(x)dF (x)
∣∣∣ ≤ C¯√V C(Π)/n+m√log(2/γ)/n. (67)
Appendix E Theorems
In this section we prove the theorems in the main text. Results in the main text follow as
corollaries of the following theorem.
Theorem E.1. Suppose conditions in Theorem 5.1 holds. Then,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|W (pi)−Wn(pˆiaipwmc,ec)|
]
≤ (Γ1+Γ2) C¯
δ
(
L+
L
δ20
+
1
δ20
)
E[NM−1n,M−1Nn,1 log(Nn,1)]
√
VC(Π)
n
+KΠ(n),
for a universal constant C¯ <∞.
Proof. Recall that we defined Si(pi) =
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk). To prove the result we will use
Lemma D.10 combined with the symmetrization argument (Lemma C.4). Notice first that
by Equation (19),
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|W (pi)−Wn(pi)|
]
≤ KΠ(n) + E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|W ∗(pi)−Wn(pi)|
]
where
W ∗(pi) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
m(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)]
.
By Lemma D.2, we have that W ∗(pi) = E[Wn(pi,mc, ec)] under correct specification of
either mc or ec. Therefore for i ∈ {1, ..., n}
W ∗(pi) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[1{pi(Xi) = Di,∑k∈Ni pi(Xk) = ∑k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi
) (Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))]+
+ E
[
mc
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)]
,
where Oi = (Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|). Using the triangular inequality, we decompose the supremum
of the empirical process into three terms as follows.
sup
pi∈Π
|W (pi)−Wn(pi,mc, ec)| ≤ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣T1(pi,mc, ec)− E[T1(pi,mc, ec)]∣∣∣
+ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣T2(pi,mc, ec)− E[T2(pi,mc, ec)]∣∣∣
+ sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣T3(pi,mc)− E[T3(pi,mc)]∣∣∣
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where
T1(pi,m
c, ec) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{pi(Xi) = Di,
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk) =
∑
k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi
) Yi
T2(pi,m
c, ec) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{pi(Xi) = Di,
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk) =
∑
k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi
) mc(pi(Xi), ∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|
)
T3(pi,m
c) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
mc
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)
.
(68)
Consider the first term. Then by Lemma C.4 and the law of iterated expectations,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|T1(pi,mc, ec)− E[T1(pi,mc, ec)]|
]
≤ 2E
[
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
σi
1{pi(Xi) = Di,
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk) =
∑
k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi
) Yi|∣∣∣A]]
for σ1, ..., σn be independent Rademacher random variables. Under Assumption 5.1, by
Lemma D.6
φi(d,N) :=
1{d=Di,N=
∑
k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
d,N,Oi
) is 2δ -Lipschitz in N conditional on the data. In addition,
the function is bounded by Assumption 5.1, therefore, for v = 1
E
[
Y 2+vi
1{pi(Xi) = Di, 0 =
∑
k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
pi(Xi), 0, Oi
)2+v ∣∣∣A] < Γ21δ2+v0 <∞.
For ec being a deterministic function, by Lemma D.10 26,
E
[
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
σi
1{pi(Xi) = Di,
∑
k∈Ni pi(Xk) =
∑
k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi
) Yi|∣∣∣A]]
≤ C
δ
1
δ
√
2+v
0
E[NM−1n,M−1Nn,1 log(Nn,1)]Γ1
√
V C(Π)
n
.
Next, we bound the second term E[suppi∈Π |T2(pi,mc, ec) − E[T2(pi,mc, ec)]|]. First,
notice that by assumption mc(d, S, Zi) is Lipschitz in its second argument, and
E
[1{pi(Xi) = Di, 0 = ∑k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
pi(Xi), 0, Oi
)2+v mc(d, 0, Zi)2+v∣∣∣A] < Γ22δ2+v0 <∞.
26Notice that Lemma D.10 is stated with independence condition with respect to M + 1 degrees.
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In order for Lemma D.10 to apply to the second term, we only need to prove that, condi-
tional on (Oi, Di,
∑
k∈Ni Dk),
oi(d,N) :=
1{d = Di, N =
∑
k∈Ni Dk}
ec
(
d,N,Oi
) mc(d,N,Oi)
is Lipschitz in its second argument, for N ∈ Z. This is the case since, by Assumption 5.1,
|oi(d,N)− oi(d,N ′)| ≤ 1
δ
|mc(d,N,Zi)−mc(d,N ′, Zi)| ≤ L
δ
|N −N ′|
since mc(d,N,Zi) is L-Lipschitz. By Lemma C.4 and Lemma D.10
27, for the same argu-
ment used for the first term,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|T2(pi,mc, ec)− E[T2(pi,mc, ec)]|
]
≤ C ′ (L+ 1)
δ
√
2+v
0 δ
E[NM−1n,M−1Nn,1 log(Nn,1)]Γ2
√
V C(Π)
n
for a universal constant C ′ <∞. Similarly, by Lemma C.4 and Lemma D.10 and the same
argument used for the first term,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|T3(pi,mc)− E[T3(pi,mc)]|
]
≤ C ′′(L+ 1)E[NM−1n,M−1Nn,1 log(Nn,1)]Γ2
√
V C(Π)
n
for a universal constant C ′′ <∞. Since v = 1 under Assumption 5.1, the proof completes.
Corollary. Theorem 5.1 holds.
Proof. By standard arguments,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆimc,ec)
]
= E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−Wn(pˆimc,ec ,mc, ec) +Wn(pˆimc,ec ,mc, ec)−W (pˆimc,ec)
]
≤ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−Wn(pi,mc, ec) +Wn(pˆimc,ec ,mc, ec)−W (pˆimc,ec)
]
≤ E
[
2 sup
pi∈Π
|W (pi)−Wn(pi,mc, ec)|
]
where the last inequality follows by the triangular inequality. The bound on the right hand
side is given by Theorem E.1.
27For the application of Lemma D.10, the reader may observe that Yi defined in the lemma is trivially
equivalent to the constant 1 for this second term.
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Corollary. Theorem 5.2 hold.
Proof. By Lemma C.2
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmˆc,eˆc)
]
≤ 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)−W (pi)|
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+ 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|Wˆ aipwn (pi, mˆc, eˆc)−Wn(pi,mc, ec)|
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
.
Term (I) is bounded by Theorem E.1. We now study (II). We can write
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|Wˆ aipwn (pi, mˆc, eˆc)−Wn(pi,mc, ec)|
]
= E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Di = pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni Dk = Si(pi)}
eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
(
Yi − mˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
mˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)
−mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
))
− 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Di = pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni Dk = Si(pi)}
ec(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
(
Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)∣∣∣
≤ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Di = pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni Dk = Si(pi)}
ec(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
(Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))
×
(
ec(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)− eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
)∣∣∣]
+ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
mˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)
−mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
))∣∣∣]
+ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Di = pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni Dk = Si(pi)}
eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
(
mˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)−mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)∣∣∣].
By Assumption 5.1, and Holder’s inequality we have that
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Di = pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni Dk = Si(pi)}
ec(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
(Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))
×
(
ec(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)− eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
)∣∣∣]
≤ 1
δ2
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣(Yi −mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|))× (ec(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)− eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)∣∣∣)].
(69)
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Similarly,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1{Di = pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni Dk = Si(pi)}
eˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Oi)
(
mˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)−mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|
)∣∣∣]
≤ 1
δ
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣(mˆc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)−mc(pi(Xi), Si(pi), Zi, |Ni|)∣∣∣].
Now notice that for the conditional mean we have that the following expression
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣mˆc(pi(Xi), ∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|)−mc(pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|)
∣∣∣.
is bounded by Holder’s inequality by∣∣∣ |Ni|∑
h=1
(mc(pi(Xi), h, Zi, |Ni|)− mˆc(pi(Xi), h, Zi, |Ni|))1{
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk) = h}
∣∣∣
≤ max
s≤|Ni|
|mc(pi(Xi), s, Zi, |Ni|)− mˆc(pi(Xi), s, Zi, |Ni|)|.
A similar bound applies to Equation (69). By Assumption 5.2 the proof completes.
E.1 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Throughout the proof we define
Ii(pi) = 1{pi(Xi) = Di,
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk) =
∑
k∈Ni
Dk}, I˜i(d, s) = 1{d = Di, s =
∑
k∈Ni
Dk},
ei(pi) = e
(
pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)
, e˜i(d, s) = e
(
d, s, Zk∈Ni , Zi, |Ni|
)
mi(pi) = m(pi(Xi),
∑
k∈Ni
pi(Xk), Zi, |Ni|), m˜i(pi) = m(d, s, Zi, |Ni|).
(70)
We denote
ε˜i = Yi −m(Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|). (71)
Whenever we use the eˆ, mˆ we refer to the corresponding estimator.
By Lemma C.2
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipwmˆc,eˆc)
]
≤ 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|W aipwn (pi,mc, ec)−W (pi)|
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+ 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|Wˆ aipwn (pi, mˆc, eˆc)−Wn(pi,mc, ec)|
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
.
77
Term (I) is bounded by Theorem E.1. We now study (II).
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
|Wˆ aipwn (pi, mˆc, eˆc)−Wn(pi,mc, ec)|
]
= E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
(mi(pi)− mˆi(pi)) + εi Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
+ mˆi(pi)−mi(pi)|
]
= E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)
(mi(pi)− mˆi(pi)) + ε˜i Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
+
(Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
− 1
)
mˆi(pi)−mi(pi)|
]
.
(72)
The last equality follows after adding and subctracting the component Ii(pi)ei(pi)(mi(pi) −
mˆi(pi)). Observe now that we can bound the above component as follows.
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)
(mi(pi)− mˆi(pi)) + ε˜i Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
+
(Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
− 1
)
mˆi(pi)−mi(pi)|
]
≤E
[
sup
pi∈Π
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)
(mi(pi)− mˆi(pi))
∣∣∣]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ε˜i
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)∣∣∣]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
+ E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ε˜i
Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
∣∣∣]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
+E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
− 1
)
(mˆi(pi)−mi(pi))
∣∣∣]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iv)
.
(73)
We study each term seperately. We start from (ii). Observe now that by the proposed
Network cross-fitting procedure in Algorithm 1, under Assumption 5.3, we claim that
E
[
ε˜i
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)]
= 0. (74)
This follows by the underlying argument:
E
[
ε˜i
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)]
= E
[
E
[
ε˜i
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)∣∣∣Zk∈Ni , Zi, Ni, Di, Dk∈Ni]]. (75)
We now expand the above expression as follows
E
[
E
[(
r(Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|, εi)−m(Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|)
)(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
−Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)∣∣∣Zk∈Ni , Zi, Ni, Di, Dk∈Ni]].
(76)
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Observe now that since eˆi(pi) is estimated on an independent sample from unit i, we have
under Assumption 3.4,
E
[
r(Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|, εi)
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)∣∣∣Zk∈Ni , Zi, Ni, Di, Dk∈Ni] =
m(Di,
∑
k∈Ni
Dk, Zi, |Ni|)
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
) (77)
which guarantees that Equation (74) holds. Using Lemma C.4, we have that
(ii) ≤ 2E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σiε˜i
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)∣∣∣] (78)
where σi are Radamacher random variables. For n > N˜ , we have that
sup
pi∈Π,i
∣∣∣Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
∣∣∣ ≤ sup
d,s,i
∣∣∣ I˜i(d, s)
e˜i(d, s)
− I˜i(d, s)
ˆ˜ei(d, s)
∣∣∣ ≤ 2
δ
. (79)
Therefore, since s is discrete we obtain that for n ≥ N˜ ,
I˜i(d, s)
e˜i(d, s)
− I˜i(d, s)
ˆ˜ei(d, s)
(80)
is Lipschitz in s with constant 4/δ. Under Assumption 5.1, we obtain that ε˜i has third
moment bounded. Under Lemma D.10, Assumption 3.3, the bounded degree assumption
and the law of iterated expectations, we have that for n ≥ N˜ ,
E
[
sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
σiε˜i
(Ii(pi)
eˆi(pi)
− Ii(pi)
ei(pi)
)∣∣∣] ≤ C¯√VC(Π)/n (81)
for a constant C¯ which does not depend on n. Notice now that the same reasoning also
applies to (iii) and (iv) since, under the Network cross-fitting rule, each of these elements
is centered around zero. We are now left to bound (i). Observe that we have
(i) ≤ E
[√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
d,s
( 1
e˜i(d, s)
− 1
ˆ˜ei(d, s)
)2√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
d,s
(
m˜i(d, s)− ˆ˜mi(d, s)
)2]
≤ E
[√√√√E[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
d,s
( 1
e˜i(d, s)
− 1
ˆ˜ei(d, s)
)2]√√√√E[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
sup
d,s
(
m˜i(d, s)− ˆ˜mi(d, s)
)2]] ≤ C¯n1/2,
(82)
which concludes the proof.
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Theorem 8.2
By the law of iterated expectations we obtain that if either mc or ec are correctly specified,
and since the identification conditions also hold on target units,
E[W tn(pi,mc, ec)] = W (pi) (83)
similarly to what discussed in Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018). We can now bound the regret
using similar arguments as above. In particular, by trivial rearrengement, we obtain that
sup
pi∈Π
W (pi)−W (pˆiaipw) ≤ 2 sup
pi∈Π
∣∣∣W tn(pi,mc, ec)−W (pi)∣∣∣. (84)
Notice now that the exact same argument for bounding the above term follows from the
proof of Theorem E.1 holds, whereas in such a case the moment conditions also depend on
ρ¯. In particular the moment bounds are multiplied by ρ¯3. Similarly, the Lipschitz constant
of the conditional mean function also must be multiplied by the term ρ¯.
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